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Abstract
Deniable Storage Encryption for Mobile Devices
Adam Skillen
Smartphones, and other mobile computing devices, are being widely adopted globally
as the de-facto personal computing platform. Given the amount of sensitive informa-
tion accumulated by these devices, there are serious privacy and security implications
for both personal use and enterprise deployment.
Conﬁdentiality of data-at-rest can be eﬀectively preserved through storage en-
cryption. All major mobile OSes now incorporate some form of storage encryption.
In certain situations, this is inadequate, as users may be coerced into disclosing their
decryption keys. In this case, the data must be hidden so that its very existence can
be denied. Steganographic techniques and deniable encryption algorithms have been
devised to address this speciﬁc problem. This dissertation explores the feasibility
and eﬃcacy of deniable storage encryption for mobile devices. A feature that allows
the user to feign compliance with a coercive adversary, by decrypting plausible and
innocuous decoy data, while maintaining the secrecy of their sensitive or contentious
hidden data. A deniable storage encryption system, Mobiflage, was designed and
implemented for the Android OS, the ﬁrst such application for mobile devices.
Current mobile encryption mechanisms all rely, in some way, on a user secret.
Users notoriously choose weak passwords that are easily guessed/cracked. This thesis
oﬀers a new password scheme for use with storage encryption. The goal is to create
iii
passwords that are suitably strong for protection of encryption keys, easier to input
on mobile devices, and build on memorability research in cognitive psychology for a
better user experience than current password guidelines.
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Smartphones and tablets are now powerful computing devices, aﬀording most of the
capabilities found on laptop and desktop computers. The smartphone market share
is rapidly expanding, and millions of new devices are sold every month.1 Many users
perform the majority of their communication, web browsing, and ﬁnancial tasks on
their mobile devices, creating serious privacy and security concerns. Corporate devices
may accumulate conﬁdential or proprietary documents; while personal devices have
passwords, browsing history, and private communications.
To protect the user, in the event a device is lost or stolen, all major mobile OSes
now provide some form of encryption to protect the data stored on these devices.
In certain situations however, data conﬁdentiality achieved through encryption is
inadequate, to properly protect a user’s sensitive data. A user may be coerced into
disclosing their decryption keys. In this case, the sensitive data must be hidden
so that its very existence can be denied. Steganographic techniques and deniable
encryption algorithms have been explored to address this speciﬁc problem.
Given their portability and media capture capabilities, we assert that plausible
deniable encryption (PDE) is a signiﬁcant security requirement for mobile devices.
1http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2237315
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The added protection oﬀered by deniable storage encryption may be necessary when
the consequences for possession of contentious material can result in incarceration,
grievous bodily harm, or even death. Examples might include dissemination of cen-
sored news, literature of dissent, or evidence of atrocities.
Using PDE in these situations would not directly aid an individual in smuggling
controversial data: the storage device could be conﬁscated, erased, or destroyed.
However, PDE can protect the user, since the data may not be discovered. The user
can even provide decoy passwords and data to simulate accordance with a coercive
adversary’s orders to decrypt the data.
All of the existing storage encryption mechanisms (including PDE) rely, to some
extent, on a user secret, to protect the encryption keys. Users tend to choose poor de-
vice passwords, such as short numeric PIN codes, reminiscent of bank-card secrets [78].
On mobile devices, the user must also contend with arduous input mechanisms. Even
simple passwords take almost twice as long to type on smartphone soft-keyboards, as
compared with standard keyboards [47]. When given the choice, many users will pick
poor passwords that are easy to remember and input, but also easy to guess/crack.
Relying on existing user-chosen secrets to protect encryption keys reduces the
overall security of the cipher to the complexity of breaching the password. Password-
stretching and key derivation functions (e.g., [58, 51, 71]) have been devised to mit-
igate this risk, but in many cases are not implemented in such a way as to oﬀer a
signiﬁcant security advantage. In the case of PDE, a weak password can lead to
the exposure of the hidden data, if the password is guessed. Disclosure of deniably-




The primary aim of this dissertation is to design and implement a suitable security
mechanism for mobile devices, to contend with a coercive adversary. The additional
objective of devising an appropriate and convenient authentication scheme for pro-
tecting encryption keys is also addressed.
The main research questions explored in this dissertation are:
• Question 1: From both feasibility and eﬃcacy standpoints, is deniable storage
encryption a practical goal for mobile devices?
• Question 2: Are there uncontrollable factors, such as communication chan-
nels and ﬁlesystem/storage technologies, that will betray or compromise the
deniability of hidden data, despite a theoretically sound design?
• Question 3: Given the restrictive input mechanisms available on mobile de-
vices, can a strong and memorable password scheme be devised, suitable for
protecting mobile storage-encryption keys?
1.3 Contributions
Deniable storage encryption mechanisms exist for PCs (e.g., [97, 62]). However, at
the time of writing this dissertation, no such system is available for mobile devices.
The tight-coupling between mobile device hardware and software, along with the boot
procedure, and distinctive storage features do not lend themselves to simply porting
existing PC PDE schemes. Mobile devices also open up new existence-leakage vectors,
and sources of compromise that can betray deniability. To assess the feasibility and
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eﬃcacy of PDE for mobile devices, and address the aforementioned obstacles, the
Mobiflage scheme was designed and implemented for the Android OS. We analyze the
performance of the Mobiﬂage prototype on two mobile devices. We also explore the
sources of leakage inherent to mobile devices that may compromise deniable storage
encryption. Several of these leakage vectors have not been analyzed for existing
desktop PDE solutions.
Symmetric encryption keys are generally chosen at random, and may be as long
as 512-bits. It is unrealistic to expect a user to remember 64 random bytes, so ran-
dom keys are often protected by encrypting them with a password-derived key. This
reliance on user-chosen secrets to protect encryption keys reduces the overall security
of the cipher to the complexity of the password. This problem is compounded, as
users tend to choose poor passwords, such as short numeric PIN codes, on mobile
devices, to contend with constrained input mechanisms [78]. For example, we were
able to test all encryption keys derived from 4 and 5 digit PIN codes (110,000 in
total) for Android in under ten minutes on commodity hardware (see Appendix B).
This dissertation discusses a new password scheme for use with storage encryption.
The goal of the Myphrase design is to facilitate passwords that are suitably strong
for protection of encryption keys, easier to input on mobile devices, and alleviate
the memory burden on the user. By building on research in cognitive psychology,
Myphrase passwords are constructed to oﬀer better memorability and security: fa-
miliar words and structures are randomly combined to create user-speciﬁc multi-word
passphrases. The Myphrase system was designed and implemented for use with both
PCs and mobile devices. We analyze the expected entropy of Myphrase passphrases
with two datasets: the Enron email corpus, and the collected works of several pop-
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ular authors from Project Gutenberg. We also evaluate Myphrase using a recently
proposed framework of usability-deployability-security ratings and compare it against
similar designs.
1.4 Related Publication
Conference Paper. The work on deniable storage encryption discussed in this
dissertation has been peer-reviewed and published in the following article:
On Implementing Deniable Storage Encryption for Mobile Devices. A. Skillen
and M. Mannan. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
2013), Feb. 24-27, 2013, San Diego, CA, USA.
Technical Report. The work on strong and memorable passwords is available as a
technical report:
Myphrase: Passwords from Your OwnWords. A. Skillen and M. Mannan. Tech-
nical Report: (http:// spectrum.library.concordia.ca/ 976791/ ), Jan. 24, 2013.
1.5 Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide back-
ground information on storage encryption techniques, deniable encryption, and exist-
ing password-based encryption key protection methods. Chapter 3 presents the design
and implementation details for our mobile-device deniable-storage mechanism. We
present the threat model, evaluate the unique challenges present in the mobile envi-
ronment, and assess the security and performance of the implementation. A novel
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password-compatible key-protection mechanism, along with implementation details,
evaluation, and comparison against similar techniques, is introduced in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, we summarize the ﬁndings, in the context of the thesis objectives, and




This chapter covers some of the necessary background information and literature
related to the work discussed in this dissertation. Speciﬁc literature reviews and
background information pertinent to each project is contained within the relevant
chapters.
2.1 Full Disk Encryption
Full disk encryption (FDE) employs symmetric-key block ciphers to encrypt entire
storage devices or partitions thereof. Encryption is performed on small units, such as
sectors or clusters, to allow random access to the disk. FDE subsystems typically exist
at or below the ﬁle system layer and provide transparent functionality to the user and
applications in what is sometimes referred to as on-the-ﬂy encryption (OTFE). OTFE
implies that encryption is performed as ﬁles are written to the volume, and decryption
is performed during ﬁle access. In this manner, ﬁles only exist in a decrypted state
while they are in RAM. All data stored on the physical drive is encrypted, even
while it is actively mounted onto the ﬁlesystem. FDE schemes generally focus on
providing strong conﬁdentiality, making eﬃcient use of the storage media (i.e., no
excessive data expansion), and being relatively fast (i.e., no signiﬁcant decrease in
IO throughput). All major desktop OSes now oﬀer storage encryption with FDE
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support (e.g., Windows BitLocker, Mac OS X FileVault, and the Linux uniﬁed key
setup (LUKS)).
The traditional encryption threat model (e.g., Kerckhoﬀs’s Desiderata [53]) dis-
cusses encryption in the context of network communications. Encryption of storage-
at-rest must be treated diﬀerently, for example, since keys and IVs must be stored
locally (or else easily derived from local material). Certain crypto primitives, that
are entirely suitable for network communications, may be exploitable in the context
of FDE. Likewise, a vetted FDE implementation may not be appropriate for PDE;
see Appendix A for some examples.
Mobile devices may contain personal information, such as contacts and passwords.
Being small and portable, these devices can be easily lost or stolen. To mitigate
the consequences of such a physical security compromise, all major mobile OSes now
provide some form of encryption to protect the data stored on these devices. Some use
per-ﬁle encryption, while others use FDE to encrypt entire storage devices or volumes.
Table 2.1 provides a comparison of existing mobile encryption implementations.
2.2 Plausible Deniable Encryption
Semantic security is a property of an encryption function which states that possession
of a ciphertext alone will provide no information about the plaintext message (without
knowledge of the key) [34]. PDE deﬁnes a level of protection beyond semantic security,
in which a coercive adversary can demand the plaintext message or decryption key.
The premise of a PDE cipher, is that two or more distinct messages will result in the
same ciphertext, when encrypted with diﬀerent random inputs (e.g., diﬀerent keys or
nonces).
8
Mobile Cipher Key Type SD Card Key
OS Spec Length Encrypted Storage
Android AES-CBC 128-bit FDE No PBKDF2a (2000):
ESSIV:SHA256 Volume Footer
BlackBerry AES-CBC 256-bit File Yes PBKDF2 (20000):
Random IVs Internal Keystore
iOS AES-CBC 256-bit Filesystem N/A PBKDF2 (10000):
Random IVs + File Internal Keystore
Symbian AES-XTS 256-bitb File Yes PBKDF2
Plain IVs Internal Keystore
Windows Phone AES-CBC 128-bit File System No PBKDF2
Modified ESSIV FS Header
aPKCS#5 [51]
b128-bit AES + 128-bit XEX tweak
Table 2.1: Existing storage encryption mechanisms employed by major mobile OSes
Deniable encryption ciphers are classiﬁed in three ways [15]: (a) by which parties
are being coerced (sender, receiver, or bi-deniable); (b) by the underlying encryption
schemes (symmetric or public-key); and (c) by the time at which the decoy messages
can be created—either at the time of coercion (ad-hoc), or at the time of encryption
(plan-ahead).
For instance, a simpliﬁcation of one of Canetti’s original examples describes a
public-key PDE scheme [15]: Bob wants to encrypt a sensitive message for Alice.
Along with the intended message, he also creates a decoy message that he can provide
to a coercive adversary without penalty. He also generates a pair of random looking
nonces that, when encrypted with each message, will create identical ciphertexts
under Alice’s public key. When faced with a coercive eavesdropper, Bob can forfeit
the decoy message and nonce. Since neither Bob nor the adversary have access to
Alice’s private key, they can only re-encrypt the message with her public key, and
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observe that the resulting ciphertext is identical to what had been captured earlier.
This example demonstrates a sender-deniable, plan-ahead, public-key PDE scheme.
Several new ciphers, or enhancements to existing ciphers, have been proposed to
create PDE schemes (e.g., [15, 69, 27, 56]). However, most of these proposals strive
to enable PDE in network communications, and are not directly applicable to storage
encryption.
Some PDE schemes use ﬂexible deniability, in which ciphers have separate honest
and dishonest encryption algorithm variants [15]. These ciphers tend to have a non-
negligible detection probability (i.e., the adversary can detect whether the honest or
dishonest algorithm was used during encryption). Other schemes use single-algorithm
ciphers that would only be chosen by a user to enable PDE (i.e., using such a cipher
reveals the desire to enable PDE, and would not normally be used in any other
situation).
The Mobiflage scheme described below enables deniability through existing
symmetric-key block ciphers, as opposed to specially designed PDE ciphers. Mobiﬂage
is, strictly speaking, a steganographic (data hiding) technique, although it achieves
the same behaviour as a PDE cipher. In terms of the PDE paradigm, Mobiﬂage is
receiver-deniable, in that the user is expected to possess the key to decrypt the mes-
sage (i.e., volume), and may instead decrypt a decoy message (i.e., decoy volume).
Mobiﬂage is a plan-ahead construction, in that the user must decide on a ﬁxed num-
ber of decoy messages (i.e., decoy volumes) at encryption time. See Section 3.9 for
existing deniable storage proposals.
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2.3 Password Protected Encryption Keys
The problem of using a low-entropy secret, such as a password, to protect a high-
entropy encryption key gave rise to key-derivation and password-stretching algo-
rithms [52]. The general idea is to use computationally expensive functions to add
a known amount of complexity to a low-entropy secret, hence slowing an exhaustive
search of the keyspace. The most widely used such algorithm is possibly the PKCS#5
standard: password based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2) [51].
In the original PBKDF2 proposal, Kaliski suggests 1000 iterations of the HMAC-
SHA1 hash algorithm [51]. At the time, in the year 2000, it was believed that 1000
iterations would require one second to derive a single key on commodity hardware.
The negligible delay for a single password would compound to signiﬁcantly slow a
brute-force attack. Since the time of publication, computer performance has grown
exponentially. The implication of Moore’s law [66] (which has, for the most part, held
true) is that computing power has roughly doubled every two years. So the original
1000 iterations should now, thirteen years later, require closer to 100,000 iterations
to achieve the same one second delay. Unfortunately, most implementations use
relatively low iteration counts (e.g., Google Android uses 2000 and Apple iOS uses
10,000). Additionally, custom single-purpose hardware (e.g., ASICs and FPGAs) can
be designed to perform the computations much faster than commodity hardware.
Other password-stretching algorithms have been proposed (e.g., [58, 71]). The
scrypt [71] proposal relies on both computationally complex and memory expensive
functions, to mitigate the advantage gained by custom hardware. NIST approved an
AES key-wrapping function [83] for the protection of random encryption keys. The
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drawback is that the key-encryption-key (KEK) must be a valid AES key-length, and
is therefore likely to be used in combination with a passphrase stretching function.
In addition to the problems with iteration count and custom hardware, the user’s
choice of password can also reduce the necessary search space. When given the choice,
users will pick poor passwords that are easy to remember and input, but also easy
to guess/crack. Users rarely choose random passwords, and instead choose sequences
that are easy to remember and manage. Many users even choose dictionary words, or
their derivatives. New probabilistic password guessing algorithms (e.g., [106]) have
signiﬁcantly reduced the time to attack user-chosen passwords.
All of the existing mobile storage encryption mechanisms rely, to some extent, on a
user secret, to protect the encryption keys. The overall security of the crypto-system
is reduced to the complexity of the weakest component. Given the poor decisions
made in key-derivation implementations, as well as advances in password guessing, it
is unwise to rely on user-chosen secrets to protect encryption keys.
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Chapter 3
Mobiflage: Deniable Storage Encryption for
Mobile Devices
This chapter discusses the design, implementation, and evaluation of a deniable stor-
age encryption scheme suitable for mobile devices. Existing, and newly discovered,
challenges that can compromise PDE in a mobile environment are explored. To ad-
dress these obstacles, a system called Mobiflage that enables PDE on mobile devices
was designed and implemented for the Android OS. By leveraging lessons learned
from known issues in deniable encryption for the desktop environment, new counter-
measures for threats speciﬁc to mobile systems are incorporated into the design. To
restrict attacks that may compromise deniability, strict user compliance is necessary,
including the use of a strong password to protect the PDE key (see our design in
Chapter 4 for an example scheme).
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
Smartphones and other mobile computing devices are being widely adopted globally.
For instance, according to a comScore report [18], there are more than 119 million
smartphone users in the USA alone, as of Nov. 2012. With this increased use, the
amount of personal/corporate data stored in mobile devices has also increased. Due
to the sensitive nature of (some of) this data, all major mobile OS manufacturers now
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include some level of storage encryption. Some vendors use ﬁle based encryption, such
as Apple’s iOS, while others implement FDE. Google introduced FDE in Android 3.0
(for tablets only); FDE is now available for all Android 4.x devices, including tablets
and smartphones.
While Android FDE is a step forward, it lacks deniable encryption—a critical
feature in some situations, e.g., when users want to provide a decoy key in a plausible
manner, if they are coerced to give up decryption keys. Plausible deniable encryption
(PDE) was ﬁrst explored by Canetti et al. [15] for parties communicating over a
network. As it applies to storage encryption, PDE can be simpliﬁed as follows:
diﬀerent reasonable and innocuous plaintexts may be output from a given ciphertext,
when decrypted under diﬀerent decoy keys. The original plaintext can be recovered
by decrypting with the true key. In the event that a ciphertext is intercepted, and
the user is coerced into revealing the key, she may instead provide a decoy key to
reveal a plausible and benign decoy message. The Rubberhose ﬁlesystem for Linux
(developed by Assange et al. [3]) is the ﬁrst known instance of a PDE-enabled storage
system.
Some real-world scenarios may mandate the use of PDE-enabled storage—e.g., a
professional/citizen journalist, or human rights worker operating in a region of conﬂict
or oppression. In a recent incident [96], an individual risked his life to smuggle his
phone’s micro SD card, containing evidence of atrocities, across international borders
by stitching the card beneath his skin. Mobile phones have been extensively used
to capture and publish many images and videos of recent popular revolutions and
civil disobedience. When a repressive regime disables network connectivity in its
jurisdiction, PDE-enabled storage on mobile devices can provide a viable alternative
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for data exﬁltration. With the ubiquity of smartphones, we postulate that PDE would
be an attractive or even a necessary feature for mobile devices. Note, however, that
PDE is only a technical measure to prevent a user from being punished if caught with
contentious material; an adversary can always wipe/conﬁscate the device itself if such
material is suspected to exist.
Several existing solutions support full disk encryption with plausible deniability in
regular desktop operating systems. Possibly the most widely used such tool is True-
Crypt [97]. To our knowledge, no such solutions exist for any mainstream mobile
OSes, although PDE support is apparently more important for these systems, as mo-
bile devices are more widely used and portable than laptops or desktops. Also, porting
desktop PDE solutions to mobile devices is not straightforward due to the tight cou-
pling between hardware and software components, and intricacies of the system boot
procedure. For example, in Android, the framework must be partially loaded to use
the soft keyboard for collecting decoy/true passwords; and the TrueCrypt boot-loader
is only designed to chain-load Windows.
We introduce Mobiflage, a PDE-enabled storage encryption system for the An-
droid OS. It includes countermeasures for known attacks against desktop PDE im-
plementations (e.g., [21]). We also explore challenges more speciﬁc to using PDE
systems in a mobile environment, including: collusion of cellphone carriers with an
adversary; the use of ﬂash-based storage as opposed to traditional magnetic disks; and
ﬁle systems such as Ext4 (as used in Android) that are not so favourable to PDE.
Mobiﬂage addresses several of these challenges. However, to eﬀectively oﬀer deniabil-
ity, Mobiﬂage must be widely deployed, e.g., adopted in the mainstream Android OS.
As such, we implement our Mobiﬂage prototype to be compatible with Android 4.x.
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The academic contributions of this research include:
1. We explore sources of leakage inherent to mobile devices that may compromise
deniable storage encryption. Several of these leakage vectors have not been
analyzed for existing desktop PDE solutions.
2. We present the Mobiﬂage PDE scheme based on hidden encrypted volumes—the
ﬁrst such scheme for mobile systems to the best of our knowledge.
3. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of Mobiﬂage for Android 4.x
(Ice Cream Sandwich and Jelly Bean). We incorporated our changes into 4.x
and maintained the default full disk encryption system. During the normal
operation of Mobiﬂage (i.e., when the user is not using hidden volumes), there
are no noticeable diﬀerences to compromise the existence of hidden volumes.
4. We address several challenges speciﬁc to Android. For example, to avoid PDE-
unfriendly features of the Ext4 ﬁle system (as used for the Android userdata
partition), we implement our hidden volumes (userdata and external) within
the FAT32-based external partition.
5. We analyze the performance impact of our implementation during initialization
and for data-intensive applications. In a Nexus S device, our implementation
appears to perform almost as eﬃciently as the default Android 4.x encryption
for the applications we tested. However, the Mobiﬂage setup phase takes more
time than Android FDE, due to a two-pass wipe of the external storage (our
Nexus S required almost twice as long; exact timing will depend on the size and
type of external storage).
16
3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
In this section, we discuss Mobiﬂage’s threat model and operational assumptions, and
few legal aspects of using PDE in general. The major concern with maintaining plau-
sible deniability is whether the system will provide some indication of the existence
of any hidden data. Mobiﬂage’s threat model and assumptions are mostly based on
past work on desktop PDE solutions (cf. TrueCrypt [97]); we also include threats
more speciﬁc to mobile devices.
Threat model and operational assumptions.
1. Mobiﬂage must be merged with the default Android code stream, or a widely
used custom ﬁrmware based on Android (e.g., CyanogenMod1) to ensure that
many devices are capable of using PDE. Then an adversary will be unable to
make assumptions about the presence of hidden volumes based on the availabil-
ity of software support. We do not require a large user base to employ PDE; it
is suﬃcient that the capability is widespread, so the availability of PDE will not
be a red ﬂag. Similar to TrueCrypt [97], all installations of Mobiﬂage include
PDE capabilities. There are no identifying technical diﬀerences between the
default and PDE encryption modes. However, when more users enable default
encryption, they help to obscure those that use PDE.
2. Mobiﬂage currently requires a physical or emulated FAT32 SD card. Devices,
such as the Nexus S, which use an internal eMMC partition as opposed to a
removable SD card are supported. Some devices, such as the Galaxy Nexus,
have neither physical nor emulated external storage. Instead, they use the
1http://www.cyanogenmod.org/
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media transfer protocol (MTP) and share a single Ext4-formatted partition for
the (internal) app storage and (external) user accessible storage. These devices
are not currently supported; possible solutions are outlined in Section 3.6.3.
3. The adversary has the encrypted device and full knowledge of Mobiﬂage’s de-
sign, but lacks the PDE key (and the corresponding password). The oﬀset of
Mobiﬂage’s hidden volume is dependent on the PDE password, and is therefore
also unknown to the adversary.
4. The adversary has some means of coercing the user to reveal their encryption
keys and passwords (e.g., unlock-screen secret), but will not continue to punish
the user once it becomes futile (e.g., the adversary is convinced that he has
obtained the true key, or the assurance that no such key actually exists). To
successfully provide deniability in Mobiﬂage, the user is expected to refrain from
disclosing the true key.
5. The adversary can access the user device’s internal and external storage, and
can have root-level access to the device after capturing it. The adversary can
then manipulate disk sectors, including encryption/decryption under any decoy
keys learned from the user; this can compromise deniability (e.g., the “copy-
and-paste” attack [32]). Mobiﬂage addresses these issues.
6. The adversary model of desktop FDE usually includes the ability to periodically
access or snapshot the encrypted physical storage (cf. [21, 1]). However, this
assumption is unlikely for mobile devices and has therefore been relaxed (as
the adversary will have access to the storage media only after apprehending the
user).
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7. In addition to the Dolev-Yao network attacker model [67, 24], we also assume
that the adversary has some way of colluding with the wireless carrier or ISP
(e.g., a state-run carrier, or subpoena power over the provider). Adversaries
can collect network/service activity logs from these carriers to reveal the use of
a PDE mode on suspected devices. This assumption signiﬁcantly strengthens
the attacker model, nonetheless, is quite realistic (see e.g., [22]).
8. We assume the mobile OS, kernel, and boot-loader are malware-free, and while
in the PDE mode, the user does not use any adversary controlled apps to
avoid leaking information via those apps; i.e., in the PDE mode, the user is
expected to use only trusted apps. The device ﬁrmware and baseband OS are
also trusted. Control over the baseband OS may allow an adversary to monitor
calls and intercept network traﬃc [103], which may be used to reveal the PDE
mode. Mobile malware, and deﬁning/verifying trusted code are independent
problems, and are out of scope here.
9. We assume the adversary cannot capture the user device while in the PDE
mode; otherwise, user data can be trivially retrieved if the device is unlocked.
We require the user to follow certain guidelines, e.g., not using Mobiﬂage’s PDE-
mode for regular use; other precautions are discussed in Section 3.5. Following
these guidelines may require non-trivial eﬀort, but is required for maintaining
deniability in our threat model.
10. The storage medium is assumed to be divided, either physically or logically,
into 512-Byte sectors, for use with the FDE system. All calculations below
(e.g., Equation 3.3) are performed modulo 512-Bytes.
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Legal aspects. Some countries require mandatory disclosure of encryption keys in
certain cases. Failure to do so may lead to imprisonment and/or other legal actions;
several such incidents occurred in the recent past (e.g., [93, 94]). Cryptography can
be used for both legal and illegal purposes and governments around the globe are
trying to ﬁgure out how to balance laws against criminal use and user privacy. As
such, laws related to key disclosure are still in ﬂux, and vary widely among coun-
tries/jurisdictions; see e.g., Koops [57].
Some of our recommendations, such as spooﬁng the IMEI or using an anony-
mous/“burner” SIM card, may be illegal in certain regions. Local laws should be
consulted before following such steps. Mobiﬂage is proposed here not to encourage
breaking laws; we want to technically enable users to beneﬁt from PDE, but leave it
to the user’s discretion how they will react to certain laws. Our hope is that Mob-
iﬂage will be predominantly used for good purposes; e.g., human rights activists in
repressive regimes.
3.3 Mobiflage Design
In this section, we detail our design and explain certain choices we made. User steps
for Mobiﬂage are also provided. Parts of the design are Android speciﬁc, as we use
Android for our prototype implementation; however, we believe certain aspects can
be abstracted to other systems. Challenges to port the current design into other OSes
need further investigation (e.g., Apple iOS does not use FDE, and the ﬁle system and
storage layout are also diﬀerent).
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3.3.1 Overview and Modes of Operation
We implement Mobiﬂage by hiding volumes in empty space on a mobile device’s
external (SD or eMMC) storage partition. We ﬁrst ﬁll the storage with random noise,
to conceal the existence of additional encrypted volumes. We create two adjacent
volumes: a userdata volume for applications and settings, and a larger auxiliary
volume for accumulating documents, photos, etc. The exact location of the hidden
volumes on the external storage is derived from the user’s deniable password. We
store all hidden volumes in the external storage, due to certain ﬁle system limitations
discussed in Section 3.6.3.
We deﬁne the following modes of operation for Mobiﬂage. (a) Standard mode is
used for day-to-day operation of the device. It provides storage encryption without
deniability. The user will supply their decoy password at boot time to enter the
standard mode. In this mode, the storage media is mounted in the default way (i.e.,
the same conﬁguration as a device without Mobiﬂage). We use the terms “decoy”
and “outer” interchangeably when referring to passwords, keys, and volumes in the
standard mode. (b) PDE mode is used only when the user needs to gather/store data,
the existence of which may need to be denied when coerced. The user will supply
their true password during system boot to activate the PDE mode; we mount the
hidden volumes onto the ﬁle-system mount-points where the physical storage would
normally be mounted (e.g., /data, /mnt/sdcard). We use the terms “true”, “hidden”
and “deniable” interchangeably when referring to passwords, keys, and volumes in
the PDE mode.
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3.3.2 Steganographic File-systems vs. Hidden Volumes
There are currently two main types of PDE systems for use with FDE: stegano-
graphic ﬁle systems (e.g., StegFS [1, 62]) and hidden volumes (e.g., TrueCrypt [97] and
FreeOTFE [31]). Steganographic ﬁle systems’ known drawbacks include: ineﬃcient
use of disk space, possible data loss, and increased IO operations. These limitations
are unacceptable in a mobile environment, for reasons such as performance sensibil-
ity, and relatively limited storage space. (For more background on these systems, see
Section 3.9.2.) Consequently, we choose to use hidden volumes for Mobiﬂage. This
implies: no altered ﬁle system drivers are required; IO is as eﬃcient as a standard
encrypted volume; and the chance of data loss is mitigated, although not completely
eliminated. Most deniable ﬁle systems are lossy by nature. Hidden volumes mitigate
this risk by placing all deniable ﬁles toward the end of the storage device. Assuming
the user knows how much space is available for the deniable volume, they can refrain
from ﬁlling the outer volume past the point at which the hidden volumes begin.
3.3.3 Storage Layout
The entire disk is encrypted with a decoy key and formatted for regular use; we call
this the outer volume. Then additional ﬁle systems are created at diﬀerent oﬀsets
within the disk and encrypted with diﬀerent keys; these are referred to as hidden
volumes. To prevent leakage, Mobiﬂage must never mount hidden volumes alongside
outer volumes. Thus, we create corresponding hidden volumes, or RAM disks, for
each mutable system mount point (e.g., /userdata, /cache, /mnt/sdcard).
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Some hidden volumes may be decoys, but at least one hidden volume will contain
the actual sensitive data and be encrypted with the true key. Since the outer volume is
ﬁlled with random noise before formatting, there are no distinguishing characteristics
between empty outer-volume blocks and hidden volume blocks. When the outer
volume (or a hidden decoy volume) is mounted, it does not reveal the presence or
location of any other hidden volumes. All hidden volumes are camouﬂaged amongst
the random noise. The disk can be thought of as the concatenation of encrypted
volumes, each with a diﬀerent key:
EK1(V ol1)||EK2(V ol2)||...||EKn(V oln) (3.1)
Here, EK(·) represents a symmetric encryption function with key K and || represents
concatenation.
When the disk is decrypted with a given key, the other volumes will appear to be
uniformly random data. When the user is coerced, she can provide the outer volume
key and claim that no other volumes exist:
DK1(V ol1||V ol2||...||V oln) = V ol1||Rand (3.2)
Here, DK(·) represents the symmetric decryption function with key K (corresponding
to EK(·)) and Rand represents data that cannot be distinguished from random bits.
Therefore, a forensic analysis of the decrypted outer volume will not indicate the
existence of hidden volumes. However, some statistical deviations may be used to
distinguish the random data from the cipher output; see Section 3.6.1. Also, the
adversary may not trust the user to have disclosed all volume keys and continue to
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(b) Encrypted volumes are created at different offsets using different keys; each volume is





(c) When the outer volume is decrypted, it appears to consume the entire disk and the inner




(d) When an inner volume is decrypted, all other volumes are hidden among the random
noise
Figure 3.1: Hidden volume storage layout
coerce her for additional keys. At this time, the user can provide decoy keys for other
hidden volumes and insist that all the volumes have been exposed. Revealing the
existence of any hidden volume may either help or hinder the user, depending on the
situation; see Section 3.7, item (e).
Each decrypted volume will appear to consume all remaining disk space on the
device. For this reason it is possible to destroy the data in the hidden volumes
by writing to the currently mounted volume past the volume boundary. This is
unavoidable since a visible limit on the mounted volume would indicate the presence
of hidden volumes. Figure 3.1 depicts a graphical representation of the storage layout.
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3.3.4 Offset Calculation
The oﬀset to a hidden volume is generated as follows (calculations are performed
modulo 512-Bytes):
offset = ⌊0.75× vlen⌋ −
(
H(pwd||salt) mod ⌊0.25× vlen⌋
)
(3.3)
Here, H is a PBKDF2 iterated hash function [51], vlen is the number of 512-byte
sectors on the logical block storage device, pwd is the true password, and salt is a
random salt value for PBKDF2. The salt value used here is the same as for the
outer volume key derivation (i.e., stored in the encryption footer). Thus, we avoid
introducing an additional ﬁeld in the default encryption footer that may indicate the
presence of hidden volumes. The generated oﬀset is greater than one half and less
than three quarters of the disk; i.e., the hidden volume’s size is between 25-50% of
the total disk size (assuming only one hidden volume is used). We choose this oﬀset
as a balance between the hidden and outer sizes: the outer volume will be used more
often, the hidden volume is used only when necessary. To avoid overwriting hidden
ﬁles while the outer volume is mounted, we recommend the user never ﬁlls their outer
volume beyond 50%.
Deriving the oﬀset in the above manner (Equation 3.3) allows us to avoid storing
it anywhere on the disk, which is important for deniability. For comparison, True-
Crypt uses a secondary volume header to store the hidden oﬀset, encryption key and
other parameters; all the header ﬁelds are either random or encrypted, i.e., indistin-
guishable from the encrypted volume data. In contrast, Android uses volume footers
containing plaintext ﬁelds, similar to the Linux uniﬁed key setup (LUKS [32, 33])
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header. Introducing a new ﬁeld to store the oﬀset would reveal the use of Mobiﬂage
PDE, so we choose to derive the oﬀset from the password instead. Other systems,
e.g., FreeOTFE, mandate users to remember the oﬀset; prompting the user for the
oﬀset at boot time may also be a red ﬂag for the adversary. The obvious downside of
a password-derived oﬀset is that the user has no input on the size of the hidden vol-
umes. One possible method to accommodate user choice is discussed in Section 3.4.4,
item (2).
Alternatively, the oﬀset could have been ﬁxed at a given location on the disk (e.g.,
always appearing at 50%). However, there is a minor security beneﬁt in deriving the
oﬀset as shown in Equation 3.3: it complicates a dictionary attack, by mandating the
adversary capture a larger portion of the disk. If the oﬀset was at a known location,
then an adversary could perform a dictionary attack on a couple of kilobytes of data
captured from that region (only the key and ﬁlesystem magic-number are necessary
to prove the existence of a hidden volume). With our approach, the adversary must
capture at least 25% of the storage to mount an attack. Note that the eﬃciency of
a dictionary attack is not aﬀected by the oﬀset location (see Section 3.7, item (a)).
Copying 25% of the storage may reduce the adversary’s ability to process a large
number of target users (e.g., all individuals passing through a customs checkpoint).
3.3.5 User Steps
Here, we describe how users may interact with Mobiﬂage, including initialization and
use.
Users must ﬁrst enable device encryption with PDE (e.g., through the settings





either oﬀ, or booted in the standard mode. If the user is apprehended with the device
in the PDE mode, deniability is lost. Even if the user shuts the device oﬀ shortly
before being apprehended, there is a possibility that the adversary can obtain the key
from data remanence in the RAM (e.g., the cold-boot attack [36]).
If the user is apprehended with her device, she can supply a decoy password, and
claim that no hidden volumes exist. The adversary can examine the storage but will
not ﬁnd any record of the hidden ﬁles, apps, or activities. Depending on the situation,
the user can provide additional decoy passwords, when faced with continued coercion.
A rational adversary may not punish the user if they have no reason to believe that
(further) hidden data exists on the device. Assuming the user can overcome any
coercion the adversary attempts, and does not reveal the true key, the adversary will
have no evidence of the hidden data.
3.4 Mobiflage Implementation
We developed and tested Mobiﬂage on a Google/Samsung Nexus S phone using the
4.0 (ICS) and 4.1 (JB) Android source code. The addition of PDE functionality
to the Android volume mounting daemon (vold) required less than one thousand
additional lines of code, and subtle changes to the default kernel conﬁguration. We
also discuss current limitations of Mobiﬂage. In addition to the Nexus S, we also
tested the portability of our prototype to a Motorola Xoom.
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Figure 3.5: Android FDE footer; note that some fields (e.g., the cipher specification) is
stored in clear text)
3.4.1 Changes to Android FDE
We ﬁrst provide a brief introduction to Android FDE, as Mobiﬂage has been imple-
mented by enhancing this scheme. We then discuss the changes we introduced.
The Android encryption layer is implemented in the logical volume manager
(LVM) device-mapper crypto target: dm-crypt [23]. Encryption takes place below
the ﬁle system and is hence transparent to the OS and applications. The AES cipher
is used in the CBC mode with a 128-bit key. ESSIV is used to generate unpredictable
IVs to prevent watermarking attacks (Fruhwirth [32]; see also Section 3.6.1). A ran-
domly chosen master volume key is encrypted with the same cipher by a key derived
from 2000 iterations of the PBKDF2 [51] digest of the user’s screen-unlock password
and a salt value. To enable encryption, the user must choose either an unlock pass-
word or PIN (i.e., pattern and “Face Unlock” secrets may not be used). The cipher
speciﬁcation, encrypted master key and salt are stored in a footer located in the last
16KB of the userdata partition; see Figure 3.5 for an example Android encryption
footer.
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When the device is booted and fails to ﬁnd a valid Ext4 ﬁle system on the userdata
partition, the user is prompted for their password. The master key is decrypted from
their password-derived key. Storage read/write operations are passed through the
device mapper crypto target, so encryption/decryption is performed on-the-ﬂy for
any IO access. If a valid Ext4 ﬁle system is then found in the dm-crypt target, it is
mounted and the system continues to boot as usual. Otherwise, the user is asked to
re-enter their password. By default, removable SD cards are not encrypted; however,
emulated external storage (i.e., a physical eMMC partition, mounted at /mnt/sdcard)
is encrypted.
We made three important changes to the default Android encryption scheme that
are necessary to defend deniability: (a) we use the XTS-AES cipher instead of CBC-
AES; (b) we enable encryption of removable storage; and (c) we wipe the SD card
with random data. XTS-AES is chosen as a precaution against copy-and-paste and
malleability attacks (see Section 3.6.1 for details). We use a 512-bit key (256-bit for
AES and 256-bit for XEX tweak). This gives the cipher additional strength over the
128-bit Android key-length, but more importantly makes the key exactly one disk
sector in size for easy alignment of hidden volumes. Note that, although the 256-
bit random key strengthens AES, the overall security of the system defaults to the
strength of the password used to protect the volume key. The xts and gf128mul
kernel crypto modules were compiled for our development devices, to enable the XTS
mode. These modules are available in the Linux kernel since version 2.6.24.
Android encryption can be performed in-place (i.e., reading each sector, encrypt-
ing it, and writing it back to the disk), or by ﬁrst formatting the storage media.
We perform the wipe operation on the SD card even when the user enables in-place
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Volume Mount point Mode Description
Boot N/A N/A Boot-loader and kernel image
Recovery N/A N/A Recovery tools and backup kernel
System /system RO OS binaries, Dalvik VM, etc.
Cache /cache RW
Temporary space for OS and apps
(e.g., OTA updates and downloaded .apk packages)
Device log /devlog RW Persistent system logs




RW App and user data (e.g., photos, maps, music)
Table 3.1: Typical volumes on common Android devices (RO: read-only; RW: read-write;
N/A: not applicable)
encryption. We enhance the wipe operation to ﬁll the ﬂash media with random data
to address data remanence issues and to hide the PDE volumes (see Section 3.6.2 for
details). These changes are necessary even when encrypting without PDE, to make
the default encryption indiscernible from PDE. Our changes should not negatively
aﬀect the security of Android FDE.
3.4.2 Partitions and File-system Support
Here we describe the Android storage layout and ﬁle systems, as well as the Mobiﬂage
storage structure used to implement PDE.
Device storage partitions. The exact storage layout of a mobile device is man-
ufacturer/device speciﬁc; Table 3.1 shows volumes typically found. Android 4.x has
two partitions that store user data: the internal Ext4 userdata partition and the
(emulated or physical) external FAT32 partition. The userdata partition stores apps
and settings, while the external partition stores documents, downloads, photos, etc.
We create both a hidden userdata partition and a hidden external partition for use
in the PDE mode. This allows the user to store hidden ﬁles as well as install hidden
apps. The OS and kernel are stored on read-only volumes, and can be safely shared
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Figure 3.6: Mobiflage SD card PDE layout
between the two modes. This also simpliﬁes system updates, since updating the ker-
nel/OS in the standard mode will be reﬂected in the PDE mode. Over-the-air system
updates make use of the /cache partition, which is not persistent in the PDE mode,
so updates must always take place from the standard mode. The default ﬁle system
for the internal userdata partition is Ext4. For reasons outlined in Section 3.6.3, we
cannot reliably hide a volume within an Ext4 ﬁle system. Instead, we store the hidden
volumes in the FAT32 formatted external partition.
The FAT32 ﬁle system is much less complex than Ext4. FAT32 stores the allo-
cation tables and all meta-data at the beginning of a disk. The remaining space is
uninterrupted data blocks—i.e., no FAT backups or meta-data exist in further areas
of the disk. Writing a hidden partition to an unused area of a FAT32 ﬁle system
will not create any noticeable discrepancies, as would be visible in Ext4. We create
a hidden Ext4 partition to store apps and settings, and a hidden FAT32 partition
to store ﬁles such as photos and videos; see Figure 3.6. To prevent leakage into the
outer volumes, when the hidden volumes are mounted, we use tmpfs2 RAM disks for
/cache and /devlog. We also discuss persistent cache and device log partitions in
Section 3.7, item (c).
2http://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.txt
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Mobiflage on-disk structure. Our prototype currently supports the creation of
only one hidden volume oﬀset (i.e., no additional decoy hidden volumes). The outer
userdata and external volumes are ﬁrst encrypted through the dm-crypt target. The
footer, containing only the outer volume key (encrypted with the decoy-password
derived key) and other default ﬁelds, is written to the disk in the usual manner. Before
encrypting the outer external volume, it is ﬁrst ﬁlled with random data produced with
the XTS-AES cipher under two random, discardable keys (see Section 3.6.1). This is
not performed by Android FDE, which may lead to data remanence attacks via the
ﬂash wear-levelling mechanism as discussed in Section 3.6.2.
We then generate an oﬀset from the true password as described in Section 3.3.4. A
randomly generated hidden volume key is then encrypted with a key derived from the
true password. The encrypted hidden volume key is stored in the external partition
at the derived oﬀset. The hidden volumes immediately follow the key on the disk,
and the volumes are encrypted by creating new dm-crypt mappings with the hidden
key. The hidden userdata volume is 256MB and the hidden external volume consumes
the remaining space. We choose 256MB for the userdata partition assuming this will
be suﬃcient for the installation of several hidden apps (e.g., custom browser, secure
VoIP and texting apps). This size may be user conﬁgurable (e.g., up to a maximum
of 25% of the hidden space). However, the bulk of the user data is stored in the
external storage (e.g., photos, downloads, maps), warranting a larger size.
To assess the portability of Mobiﬂage on other hardware proﬁles, we tested our
prototype on a Motorola Xoom. The Xoom uses the shared internal/external MTP
paradigm, but also contains an SD card slot. The shared MTP storage is treated
as the primary external storage, and all external app data is stored at this location
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(essentially ignoring the SD card). We altered Mobiﬂage by embedding the location
of the SD card block special ﬁle, to create and mount the hidden partitions. In
this particular conﬁguration, it is perhaps a better idea to create a single hidden
Ext4 partition, since it will house all internal and external data, and the SD card
is inaccessible to installed apps (i.e., 256MB will be insuﬃcient for MTP devices).
Other subtle tweaks may be necessary to support Mobiﬂage on diﬀerent hardware
proﬁles.
3.4.3 User Interface and Pre-boot Authentication
The default Android encryption mechanism can be enabled through the settings GUI.
This prompts the user for their screen-unlock password, which is used to derive the
volume encryption key. The system then shuts down non-essential services and starts
encrypting the internal storage in-place. A user with root privileges can also use the
vdc command-line tool (e.g., from a PC to which the Android device is connected)
to enable encryption either in-place or with data wipe, as follows:
vdc cryptfs enablecrypto <inplace|wipe> <pwd>
In this case, pwd can be any password (i.e., independent of the screen-unlock pass-
word). Currently, the user can activate Mobiﬂage PDE using vdc as follows:
vdc cryptfs pde <inplace|wipe> <outer pwd> <hidden pwd>
Note that, the default Android shell, sh, does not maintain history between sessions
(i.e., command history cannot be retrieved from a captured Android device). In-place
encryption is used only for the internal storage. We wipe the SD card to reliably ﬁll
the physical media with random noise. On ﬂash media, it is apparently suﬃcient to
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completely ﬁll the logical address space twice, as noted by Wei et al. [102]. Since
internal storage does not house any hidden volumes, we forgo the random wipe and
encrypt in-place. This allows the user to preserve their apps and settings in the
standard mode and creates a fresh install (i.e., factory reset) in the PDE mode. We
plan to incorporate the PDE options into the settings GUI in a future version of
Mobiﬂage.
When the device is booted up, the system will attempt to mount the userdata
volume. If a valid Ext4 ﬁle system is not found, the user is prompted for a password,
assuming storage encryption is in use. The system then attempts to mount the volume
with the stored key (decrypted with the password-derived key). If it fails, instead
of asking the user to try again, it will calculate the volume oﬀset from the supplied
password; see Figure 3.4. The external storage sector found at this oﬀset is decrypted
with the PBKDF2 derived key. Using the result as a volume key, the system will
attempt to mount a volume beginning at the next external storage sector after the
oﬀset. If a valid Ext4 ﬁle system is found at this location, it is mounted. After
mounting the hidden userdata and external volumes, the boot procedure continues as
usual. If a hidden ﬁle system cannot be found at the derived oﬀset, the system will
prompt the user to try again, just as it would if PDE were not enabled.
3.4.4 Limitations
Limitations of our current Mobiﬂage design and prototype include the following:
1. Mobiﬂage currently requires a separate physical FAT32 storage partition (SD
or eMMC). Devices that use MTP and share a single partition for internal and
external storage are not currently supported. We discuss the problems inherent
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to Ext4, and provide suggestions for other ﬁle systems (e.g., HFS+, Ext2/3) in
Section 3.6.3.
2. Users currently cannot set the desired size of a hidden volume; the size is derived
from a user’s password to avoid the need to store the oﬀset on the device. An
expected size may be satisﬁed as follows (not currently implemented). We can
ask users for the desired size and iterate the hash function until an oﬀset close
to the requested size is found. For example, we can perform 20 additional hash
iterations and report the closest size available with the supplied password. The
user could then choose to either accept the approximate size or enter a new
password and try again. Storing the iteration count is not needed. At boot
time, the system will perform consecutive iterations until a valid ﬁle system is
found, or a maximum count is reached (cf. [12]). This would slow down the
boot process somewhat while searching for the correct oﬀset.
3. Currently, we support only one hidden volume oﬀset. Creating additional (de-
coy) hidden volumes will require a collision prevention mechanism to derive
oﬀsets. A method, such as the iteration count mentioned above, can be used to
ensure enough space is left between hidden oﬀsets (e.g., 1.5GB). This increases
the chance of corrupting hidden data. Each hidden volume would appear to
consume the remaining SD card storage, but the address space would overlap
with other hidden volumes. We discuss the implications of multiple hidden
volumes in Section 3.7, item (e).
4. Transferring data between outer and hidden volumes may be necessary on oc-
casion; e.g., if time does not permit switching between modes before taking an
opportunistic photo. We do not oﬀer any safe mechanism for such transfers at
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present. Mounting both volumes simultaneously is a straightforward solution,
but may compromise deniability (e.g., usage log data of a hidden ﬁle may be
visible on the decoy volume). The user can transfer sensitive ﬁles to a PC as
an intermediary, then transfer the ﬁles to the PDE storage. In this case, data
remanence in the outer volume is an issue. Another possibility is to keep a
RAM disk mounted in the standard mode for storing such opportunistic ﬁles
(and then copy to the PDE storage via a PC). However, some apps, such as the
camera app, do not oﬀer an option to choose where ﬁles are saved.
3.5 Precautions against Colluding Carriers
In this section, we discuss threats from a colluding wireless carrier, and list a number
of precautions that may help maintain deniability in the presence of such a carrier.
Mobile devices are often connected to a cellphone network. It is likely that the
wireless carrier maintains activity records, with identifying information and times-
tamps, of devices interfacing with the network. These records can demonstrate that
the device is online and communicating at a given time. The use of the PDE mode
is likely to cause discrepancies between the carrier’s logs and the device’s standard
mode (outer volume) logs. For example, if the carrier has records of a phone call at a
given time, that occurred when the device was booted in the PDE mode, the device
will not have a record of the call in the standard mode; see Figure 3.7. In certain
situations, an adversary may be able to collude with the carrier (e.g., a state-based
carrier), or compel the carrier to disclose user records (e.g., by court orders). If the
user has provided the adversary with the decoy password, the adversary may ﬁnd
discrepancies between the device logs and the carrier’s logs. This would give the ad-
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3. We strongly discourage the use of mobile data networks in favor of public WiFi
hot-spots or Internet pass-through/tethering from a PC. Identifying network
traﬃc information (e.g., destination IP address) should be spoofed or obscured
with a tool such as Tor3 or a trusted (e.g., employer controlled) VPN when
using any type of network connection. This may also restrict an ISP or carrier
from correlating the user’s behavior (e.g., if the user is known to frequent a
certain ﬁle hosting service, or news agency).
4. When using the PDE mode, any web services (e.g., email, social networking)
should not be used unless a secondary account is created under a pseudonym
and is only used in the PDE mode. This will prevent any collusion between the
adversary and web service providers with which the user is known to have an
account. This includes the device registration account (e.g., Google or iTunes).
It is also recommended that auto-backup features (e.g., iCloud or Google Drive)
are disabled in the PDE mode.
3.6 Sources of Compromise
We examine three leakage vectors that may compromise deniability of a PDE scheme
on mobile devices: known issues in crypto-systems and software implementations of
desktop PDE schemes, as well as issues speciﬁc to current mobile storage systems.
Below we discuss these challenges and how they are addressed in Mobiﬂage.
3Tor on Android: https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en
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3.6.1 Leakage from Crypto Primitives
Crypto primitives used in a PDE implementation must be chosen carefully. Below
we discuss issues related to random data generation and encryption modes.
PRNG. A fundamental requirement for PDE schemes implemented with hidden vol-
umes is that the whole disk must appear to contain cryptographically secure random
data. For this requirement, the cipher output must be indistinguishable from ran-
dom bits (cf. IND$-CPA [79]). However, certain statistical deviations between cipher
and PRNG output may exist (see e.g., [30, pp. 137–161]). To sidestep any potential
statistical inconsistencies, we draw randomness from the same distribution as the ci-
phertext space by using the encryption function itself as the PRNG (in a two pass
random-wipe, each pass with a new random key). Under statistical analysis, empty
sectors in an outer volume will appear the same as the sectors in a hidden volume,
when either encrypted or decrypted with a decoy key. For comparison, TrueCrypt
uses a built-in PRNG to ﬁll empty volume space, with the assumption that the cipher
output will be indiscernible from their PRNG output.
Encryption modes. Encryption of data at rest has diﬀerent considerations than the
traditional communication encryption model. For example, to enable random-access,
FDE implementations treat each disk sector as an autonomous unit and assign sector-
speciﬁc IVs for chaining modes such as CBC. These IVs are long-term and must be
easily derived from or stored in the local system. When FDE is implemented with a
CBC-mode cipher, information leakage about the plaintext disk content may occur
without knowledge of the encryption key or cipher used (see Appendix A).Tweakable
block cipher modes (e.g., LRW and XTS) have been designed speciﬁcally for disk
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encryption to prevent attacks such as watermarking, malleability, and copy-and-paste.
These attacks are particularly important for PDE, as they may be used to identify
hidden volumes without recovering any hidden plaintexts.
The default Android FDE uses CBC. We choose to move away from the Android
default and instead, use XTS-AES [43, 68] to prevent known attacks against CBC.
XTS-AES is a code book mode (i.e., no block chaining) and uses a secondary “tweak”
key to make unpredictable use of the disk sector index. XTS-AES is not an authen-
ticated mode, and as such is considered malleable [43]. However, unlike CBC, XTS
is not malleable at a bit granularity: a modiﬁed ciphertext block will decrypt to a
random plaintext block, preventing an attacker from making a predictable change.
The absence of authentication tags also allows for a copy-and-paste attack (i.e., suc-
cessful decryption of sectors that have been moved from other disk locations). Using
CBC with random IVs will garble only the ﬁrst block, but successfully decrypt all
subsequent blocks in the moved sector. XTS-AES does not rely on block chaining,
and uses the tweak to entangle plaintext/ciphertext block pairs with their disk sector
location. As such, all blocks in a moved sector will decrypt to random plaintext. A
watermark attack relies on predictable IVs, and is mounted by convincing the user to
encrypt and store a ﬁle that has been speciﬁcally crafted to eﬀectively zero out the
IVs. The watermark manifests itself as identical ciphertext blocks at the beginning of
consecutive disk sectors. The attacker can then examine the encrypted storage and
locate the watermark. Both XTS-AES (Mobiﬂage) and CBC with ESSIV (Android
FDE), eﬀectively prevent watermarking attacks.
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3.6.2 Leakage from Flash-storage
In this section, we provide an overview of ﬂash storage technologies typically found
in mobile devices. We also discuss ﬂash leakage vectors that aﬀect PDE and, to some
extent, FDE.
Overview of flash storage. Mobile devices generally use NAND-based ﬂash stor-
age. Flash memory is not divided into sectors in the same way as magnetic disks.
Write operations take place on a page level (e.g., 4KB page) and can only change
information in one direction (e.g., changing 1 to 0, but not the inverse). Thus, write
operations can only take place on an empty page. An erase operation takes place
on a group of several pages, called an erase block (e.g., 128 pages per block). Flash
memory cells have a ﬁnite number of program/erase cycles before becoming damaged
and unusable. Therefore, ﬂash memory is often used with a wear-levelling mechanism
to prevent the same cell from being repeatedly written. In eﬀect, logical block ad-
dresses (LBAs) on the disk are mapped to diﬀerent physical memory pages for each
write operation. Thus, storage on ﬂash memory is not a linear arrangement as in
traditional magnetic disks.
When a logical disk region is overwritten, it is usually simply remapped to an
empty page without erasing the original page. This can continue until there are no
empty pages, at which time unmapped pages in erase blocks are consolidated by the
garbage collector, and empty erase blocks are wiped. Otherwise, the erase blocks must
be completely wiped and rewritten to change a single page. This requires reading the
entire erase block into cache, modifying the aﬀected page, wiping the erase block, and
ﬁnally writing the block back to the media.
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Generally, two types of ﬂash media are used in Android devices. Older Android
devices use the memory technology device (MTD) for internal storage. An MTD
is analogous to a block or character device, speciﬁcally designed for ﬂash memory
idiosyncrasies. To emulate a block device on an MTD, a software ﬂash translation
layer (FTL) is used. The FTL enables the use of a standard block ﬁle system (e.g.,
Ext4, FAT32) on top of the raw ﬂash media. Newer Android devices use embedded
multi media card (eMMC) for internal storage and secure digital (SD) for external
storage. eMMC combines the ﬂash memory and hardware controller in one package.
SD has a dedicated controller and removable storage. Both technologies are presented
to the system as block devices. The FTL for eMMC and SD storage is implemented
in ﬁrmware on the controller as opposed to a software FTL as used by MTD.
Wear-levelling issues. Flash memory does not have the same data remanence
issues as seen in magnetic storage. However, the wear-levelling mechanism may leave
old copies, or fragments of ﬁles in unmapped pages on the ﬂash disk. When making
changes to hidden ﬁles it is possible that (encrypted) fragments of the original ﬁle
will still exist in unmapped pages. This would provide an adversary with a partial
time-line, or partial snapshots, of changes made to the disk. If the adversary can
demonstrate that the regions aﬀected do not coincide with disk activity in the outer
volume, they can conclude existence of hidden volumes.
The software FTL used by the Linux MTD driver (mtdblock) is simplistic and
does not use a wear-levelling mechanism.4 Some ﬁle systems (e.g., YAFFS2) are
designed to work directly with the raw ﬂash memory instead of using an FTL. Such
ﬁle systems may implement their own wear-levelling mechanisms. This was the default
4The MTD subsystem for Linux: http://www.linux-mtd.infradead.org/faq/general.html
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technology for devices prior to Android 3.0, but has largely been replaced by eMMC
storage. The SD [86] and eMMC [49] speciﬁcations do not address wear-levelling
requirements, so it is up to the manufacturers to decide if and how to implement
wear-levelling in hardware FTLs.
Mobiﬂage stores all hidden volumes on the SD card. Therefore, exploiting the
unmapped, wear-levelling pages would require bypassing the hardware controller and
reading the raw ﬂash memory, as opposed to acquiring a logical image (e.g., as pro-
duced with the dd tool). The adversary would need to read the physical to logical
block allocation map and reconstruct the physical layout of the disk. Existing studies
of raw ﬂash performed by Wei et al. [102] have focused on writing speciﬁc strings
to the media through the hardware controller FTL, then bypassing the controller to
search for those strings in the raw physical ﬂash. It is unknown how successful an
adversary may be in demonstrating that a given unused page was part of a hidden
volume and hence compromising deniability. Further work is needed to measure the
extent to which unmapped/obsolete pages can be correlated to LBAs.
Mobile forensic tools that focus on logical data acquisition (e.g., viaExtract,5
Paraben6) cannot mount this attack. Physical acquisition mechanisms exist for MTD
storage (see e.g., Hoog [41, pp. 266–284]); however, they tend to be costly, time
consuming, and generally destroy the mobile device.
Wear-levelling has implications for both non-deniable and deniable encryption
schemes. If a disk is encrypted in-place, plaintext fragments that existed before
encryption may still remain accessible. Wei et al. [102] show that most ﬂash media




storage is used by the wear-levelling mechanism. For this reason, Wei et al. suggest
that the entire address space of a ﬂash disk should be overwritten twice with random
data, to ensure all erase blocks have been aﬀected, before encrypting the device.
Their ﬁndings show that in most cases, this is suﬃcient to ensure that every physical
page on the device is overwritten. Therefore, Mobiﬂage performs a two-pass wipe,
before encryption of the external partition, to avoid leaving any plaintext fragments
on the media, and to ensure the continuity of random data, which is crucial for PDE.
Currently, the default Android FDE does not take this precaution into consideration,
and the wipe operation is performed by simply re-formatting the ﬁle system.
A recent proposal by Reardon et al. [74] explores secure deletion for ﬂash memory.
All ﬁle system data is encrypted with per-block keys. To securely delete a ﬁle system
block, the associated key is wiped from the physical ﬂash with an ERASE command.
The data blocks are rendered un-readable, hence data remanence is not an issue.
Currently, their implementation only works with MTD storage, and would need to
be integrated into the SD/eMMC hardware controller FTL to aﬀord secure deletion
to these devices [74].
Special “discard” operation. The discard operation can be issued from a ﬁle
system to the ﬂash hardware controller. This command informs the host controller
that a certain LBA is no longer storing ﬁle system data and can be wiped at any time.
When all LBAs in an erase block are discarded, the controller’s garbage collector will
erase the block in the background. Discard eﬀectively speeds up write access time, as
an empty block can be directly written to without a read-modify-erase-write cycle.
The ERASE command (or the TRIM command for ATA controllers) takes place on
the physical layer, and when used, will zero out regions of the physical ﬂash media,
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not visible to the logical ﬁle system. Thus, the adversary may recognize the physical
blocks that are actually used to store ﬁle data. If the adversary knows the decoy
key, he may correlate physical blocks and LBAs to discover which blocks are used
by the hidden volume. As a security consideration, the dm-crypt mapper does not
forward discard commands [13], hence ensuring the continuity of random data on the
underlying physical storage.
3.6.3 Leakage from File-system and OS
The default ﬁle system for the internal storage in Android 4.x devices is Ext4. Ext4
introduced several new features including extents, uninitialized block groups, and
ﬂexible block groups [55]. The ﬂexible block group (ﬂex group) feature allows a block
group’s meta-data (e.g., inode/block bitmaps and inode table) to be located anywhere
on the disk, instead of at the beginning of each individual block group, as in earlier
Ext ﬁle systems. The default setup is to store the meta-data for 16 consecutive block
groups in the ﬁrst block group of each ﬂex group. This would make it possible to hide
ﬁles inside an empty ﬂex group without overwriting any meta data for that group.
However, as Ext4 places backup superblocks and group descriptor tables in some
block groups within each ﬂex group, any hidden data stored in a ﬂex group could
overwrite these structures; see Figure 3.8.
Additionally, the absence of backup superblocks and group descriptor tables would
be suspicious and give the adversary reason to assume that data has been hidden in
these ﬂex groups. The locations of the backup structures and ﬁle data would need to
be known when creating hidden volumes. Furthermore, when creating directories in
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Figure 3.8: Ext4 filesystem layout; overwriting the meta-data structures (dark regions)
with hidden volume data would alert the adversary to the use of PDE
group available on the disk [54]. This eﬀectively spreads directories, and the data
contained within, across the entire disk. Standard volumes, unaware of the hidden
volume location, will likely collide with hidden data regardless of where it is placed in
an Ext4 ﬁle system. Therefore, we cannot reliably hide data within an Ext4 volume
(without upstream changes in Ext4, e.g., by making directory spread optional).
One way to overcome the Ext4 backup superblock problem is to indicate those
regions of the disk as damaged or “bad blocks” when creating the hidden volume. The
hidden ﬁle system would then avoid writing data to those locations. When the outer
volume is mounted there would be no indication of tampering nor reason for suspicion.
Unfortunately, due to the Ext4 directory spread, this would not be a feasible solution
for Android MTP devices without removable storage. However, this method may be
used to implement PDE in other ﬁle systems such as NTFS, and HFS+ that employ
a more sequential write policy (i.e., they do not use a directory spread mechanism
as in Ext4). Another partial solution is to logically partition the internal storage
to include a FAT32 volume. In the standard mode, this volume would be mounted
to the SD card mount point, instead of using MTP. This partition would house the
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hidden volumes mounted in the PDE mode. MTP would be sacriﬁced in favor of the
older USB mass storage functionality when connected to a PC.
Most work in deniable disk encryption investigates data or existence leakage of
hidden ﬁles into temporary ﬁles, swap space, or OS logs (see e.g., [21]). For exam-
ple, a word processor that performs auto-save functions to a central location may
have backups and fragments of ﬁles edited from a hidden volume. If such backups
are present, and no evidence of the ﬁles are found on the disk, then the adversary
can assume the existence of hidden ﬁles and demand the true decryption key. We
explain in Section 3.7 (item (c)) that log ﬁles, swap space, and temporary storage are
eﬀectively isolated between the two modes of Mobiﬂage.
3.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate Mobiﬂage against known attacks and weaknesses.
(a) Password guessing. We rely on the user to choose strong passwords to protect
their encryption keys. The current Android encryption pre-boot authentication times-
out for 30 seconds after ten failed password attempts. The time-out will slow an online
guessing attack, but it may still be feasible, especially when weak passwords are used.
An oﬄine dictionary attack is also possible on an image of the device’s storage.
The adversary does not know the password to derive the oﬀset, but the salt is found
in the Android encryption footer. The salt is used with PBKDF2, and is a precaution
against pre-generated dictionaries and rainbow tables. The salt cannot be stored at
the hidden oﬀset as it is used in the oﬀset calculation. Using the same salt value for
both modes enables the adversary to compute one dictionary of candidate keys (after
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learning the salt), to crack passwords for both modes. Exacerbating the problem is
Android’s low PBKDF2 iteration count. On a single core of an Intel i7-2600, at 2000
iterations, we were able to calculate 513.37±1.93 keys per second using the OpenSSL
1.0.1 library. Custom hardware (e.g., FPGA/GPU arrays) and adapted hash imple-
mentations (e.g., [100]) can make oﬄine guessing even more eﬃcient. See Appendix B
for more information concerning oﬄine dictionary attacks against Android.
We tested diﬀerent hash iteration counts in PBKDF2 and found that 200,000 iter-
ations is apparently a fair compromise between security and login delay. On the Intel
i7-2600, at 200,000 iterations, we were able to calculate 5.21 ± 0.01 keys per second
(i.e., guessing attack becomes 100 times slower). On our Nexus S (1GHz Exynos-3
Cortex-A8) development phone, it required an additional 0.67± 0.01 seconds to cal-
culate a single key. Our Motorola Xoom (1GHz Tegra-T20 Cortex-A9) required an
additional 0.41 ± 0.001 seconds and an HTC EVO3D (1.2GHz MTM8660 Scorpion)
required an additional 0.70±0.01 seconds. This would slow down the boot procedure
by approximately two seconds; note that, booting into the PDE mode requires three
invocations of PBKDF2: to test the key in the footer, to calculate the oﬀset, and to
decrypt the hidden volume key. Possible computational and memory-wise expensive
replacements for PBKDF2 (e.g., [58, 71]) can also be used to mitigate custom hard-
ware attacks. In the end, we require users to choose a strong password resilient to
guessing. We introduce a design in Chapter 4 that may mitigate a password guessing
attack.
(b) Cipher issues. An implementation ﬂaw can expose FDE ciphers to a theoretical
watermarking attack that has been documented for software such as LUKS [20]. The
issue occurs when the disk is suﬃciently large and the size of the disk sector index (n)
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is small. For example, if n is a 32-bit integer, and there are more than 232 512-byte
sectors on the disk, the value of n will eventually roll-over and repeat itself. If the
adversary can create a special ﬁle with duplicate plaintext blocks at correct locations
and convince the user to store the ﬁle in their hidden volume, then the adversary can
demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume. In the given example, the duplicate
plaintext blocks would need to be repeated at 2TB intervals. The adversary will
not know what the corresponding ciphertext blocks will be, but ﬁnding identical
ciphertexts spaced at the correct distance would be strong evidence. This is an
implementation issue, and not an issue with the cipher algorithm itself. The problem
occurs for all FDE ciphers, including XTS and CBC-ESSIV, that use a sector index
smaller than the total number of disk sectors. To mitigate this problem, a longer
integer (e.g., 64-bit) is commonly used for the sector index. We use the 64-bit sector
index available in dm-crypt which will not roll over until 8192 Exabytes.
(c) Software issues. Mobiﬂage seems to eﬀectively isolate the outer and hidden
volumes. Apps and ﬁles installed in the hidden volumes leave no traces in the outer
volume. Android does not use dedicated swap space. When the OS needs more RAM
for the foreground app, it does not page entire regions of memory to the disk. Instead,
it unloads background apps after copying a small state to the userdata partition. For
example, the web browser may copy the current URLs of open tabs to disk when
unloading, instead of the entire rendered page. When the browser is loaded again,
the URL is reloaded. Leakage into swap space and paging ﬁles was shown to be
an issue for desktop PDE implementations by Czeskis et al. [21]. As the outer and
hidden userdata partitions are isolated from one another in Mobiﬂage, we do not take
any speciﬁc measures against leakage through memory paging.
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The Android Framework is stored in the /system partition which is mounted read-
only. The Linux kernel is stored in a read-only boot partition which is not mounted
onto the OS ﬁle system. Leakage through these immutable partitions is also unlikely.
Android logs are stored in a RAM buﬀer, and application logs are stored in the
userdata partition. Leakage is also unlikely through logs as the userdata partitions
are isolated and RAM is cleared when the device is powered oﬀ. Some devices keep
persistent logs at /devlog, for troubleshooting between boots. To prevent leakage
through these logs, we mount a tmpfs RAM disk to this mount point when booting
into the PDE mode. The logs will remain persistent between standard mode boots,
but no PDE mode logs are kept.
Android devices typically have a persistent cache partition used for temporary
storage. For example, the Google Play store will download application packages to
this partition before installing them on the userdata volume. To prevent leakage
through the cache partition, we mount a tmpfs RAM disk to /cache in the PDE
mode; this partition takes 32MB of RAM. An alternative to tmpfs, without sacriﬁcing
RAM, is to mount the volume through dm-crypt with a randomly generated one-time
key. The key is discarded on reboot, eﬀectively destroying the data on the partition.
(d) Partial storage snapshots. If the adversary has intermittent or regular access
to the disk, they may be able to detect modiﬁcations to diﬀerent regions of the disk.
If a decoy key has already been divulged, the adversary may surmise the existence
of hidden data by correlating ﬁle system activities to the changing disk regions. We
exclude this possibility, assuming the adversary will have access only after acquiring
the device from the user, and does not have past snapshots of the storage. If the user
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is aware that the storage has been imaged (e.g., at a border crossing), they should
re-initialize Mobiﬂage to alter every sector on the disk.
Partial snapshots may also allow the adversary to learn the location of the oﬀset:
by identifying changes to regions in the latter portion of the disk (which likely coincide
with hidden volume disk activity), and calculating the distance from the ﬁrst FAT32
data block to the hidden oﬀset. Knowing the oﬀset location can speed up a password
guessing attack. Currently, the adversary must execute the PBKDF2 function once.
The result is used twice: to calculate the oﬀset, and as an AES key to decrypt the
volume-key at that oﬀset. The adversary must then determine if the volume-key
decrypts a valid ﬁlesystem (e.g., by identifying proper FS magic number). If the
adversary is aware of the proper oﬀset location, then he can skip the latter two steps,
if the ﬁrst operation does not produce the correct oﬀset. This means each incorrect
guess is identiﬁed before the two AES operations.
(e) Practical security of multiple hidden volumes. There is some debate over
the eﬀectiveness of multiple hidden volumes [28]. Whether or not the user gains any
advantage is deﬁned by the scenario. If the user cannot be held indeﬁnitely, and
cannot be punished on the suspicion of PDE data alone, she may feign compliance by
relinquishing decoy keys. This may be advantageous to the user as, in the absence of
indisputable evidence, she will eventually be released. In other scenarios, revealing
the existence of one hidden volume may cause the adversary to suspect the existence
of additional hidden volumes. If they can hold the user indeﬁnitely, then they can
continue to demand keys. It may in fact hinder the user to reveal any hidden volumes
in this situation. However, irrespective of multiple hidden volumes, the adversary can
keep punishing a suspect up until the true password is revealed. This is an inherent
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Cipher-spec Key-length Speed (KB/s) Speed reduction
(bits) Nexus S Xoom Nexus S Xoom
Unencrypted N/A 5880±260 4767±238 - -
AES-CBC-ESSIV
(Android 4.x)





5288±69 3929±146 10.07% 17.58%
Table 3.2: Observed read/write performance of external (SD card) storage; note that Mob-
iflage reduces IO performance by approximately 5% over Android FDE
limitation of PDE schemes and may be alleviated (to some extent) by using a special
password to make the hidden data permanently inaccessible (cf. [28]).
3.8 Performance Evaluation
To understand the performance impact on the regular use of a device, we run several
tests on our prototype implementation of Mobiﬂage. This section summarizes our
ﬁndings.
We use Mobiﬂage on Nexus S and Motorola Xoom development devices by reading
from and writing to the SD card. The command-line tool cp is used to duplicate ﬁles
on the SD card. We run 20 trials on four ﬁles between 50MB and 200MB. We evaluate
the performance on unencrypted storage, under the default Android encryption, and
the Mobiﬂage scheme. Table 3.2 summarizes our results.
Note that, removable SD storage (as in the Xoom) is apparently much slower than
eMMC storage (as in the Nexus S), for all cases. Compared to the unencrypted case,
on our Nexus S, Mobiﬂage reduces IO throughput by almost 10%; in contrast, Android
FDE reduces the throughput by 5.5%. On the Motorola Xoom, Mobiﬂage reduces
throughput by 17.6% and Android FDE by 12.6%. Mobiﬂage seems to decrease
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throughput by roughly 5% over Android FDE. However, the decreased IO throughput
is negligible for regular apps and should not hinder the use of the device. For example,
a standard deﬁnition 30fps video ﬁle may have a combined audio/video bit-rate of
192 KBps. High deﬁnition video (e.g., Netﬂix) is generally below 1024 KBps. The
reduced speed of Mobiﬂage (3929 KBps) will still provide adequate buﬀering to ensure
that jitter will not be an issue in these video apps. Note that Blu-ray has a maximum
bitrate of 5000 KBps and may cause playback issues, if it is not ﬁrst re-encoded. The
observed decrease in throughput may be attributed to the chosen cipher: XTS requires
two AES operations per block; and AES-256 uses fourteen rounds of operations while
AES-128 uses ten.
Android apps are ﬁrst loaded into RAM and do not run directly oﬀ the disk.
Mobiﬂage should not aﬀect run time performance of apps. The increase in app load
time should also be practically negligible; as of Sept. 2012, the average Android app
size is about 6MB [46], although the size of certain apps (e.g., gaming) is increasing
rapidly. Some hardware, such as the camera, may use direct memory access (DMA)
and may be aﬀected: instead of writing directly to the disk, the camera data is
processed by the CPU when passing through the dm-crypt layer. We tested the
camera on our Nexus S device while in the Mobiﬂage PDE mode, and did not notice
any performance impact.
The required time to encrypt the device is increased on account of the two pass
random wipe. The exact time will depend on the size of the external storage partition.
Android FDE encrypts external eMMC partitions in-place. As such, Mobiﬂage will
take twice as long to encrypt these partitions. Removable SD cards are not encrypted
by Android FDE, so we cannot provide a static comparison. Our Nexus S has only
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1GB internal, and 15GB eMMC external storage. After three initializations, we found
that on average the default Android FDE required one hour and ﬁve minutes, and
Mobiﬂage required just under two hours. The Motorola Xoom required one hour and
ﬁfteen minutes on average for the default Android FDE to encrypt the 32GB internal
storage. Encrypting with Mobiﬂage required an additional 73 minutes when used
with a 8GB SanDisk SD card.
Power consumption will likely be increased for disk activity. This problem is
inherent to all FDE, and is not unique to Mobiﬂage. Background processes that have
high IO activity should be disabled, or IO should be buﬀered and batched to reduce
power consumption.
3.9 Related Work
In this section, we discuss deniable encryption implementations related to Mobiﬂage,
and provide an overview of available data encryption support as built into major
desktop and mobile OSes. We also discuss academic deniable-storage proposals. See
Section 2.2, for information about PDE ciphers.
3.9.1 Software Implementations
All major desktop OSes now oﬀer storage encryption with FDE support (e.g., Win-
dows BitLocker, Mac OS X FileVault, and Linux eCryptfs). FDE uses ciphers to
encrypt entire storage devices or partitions thereof. Encryption is performed on small
units, such as sectors or clusters, to allow random access to the disk. FDE subsystems
typically exist at or below the ﬁle system layer and provide transparent functionality
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to the user. FDE schemes generally focus on providing strong conﬁdentiality, making
eﬃcient use of the storage media (i.e., no excessive data expansion), and being rela-
tively fast (i.e., no signiﬁcant decrease in IO throughput). To contend with a coercive
adversary, PDE adds another layer of secrecy over FDE.
Most mobile OSes also oﬀer data encryption (without PDE). BlackBerry devices
use a password derived key to encrypt an internal storage AES key, and an ECC
private key [77]. When a device is locked, the storage and ECC keys are wiped
from RAM. Any messages received while the device is locked are encrypted with
the ECC public key, and decrypted after unlock. Removable storage can also be
encrypted. Per-ﬁle keys are generated and wrapped with a password derived key,
and/or a key stored in the internal storage. iOS devices use a UID (device unique
identiﬁer) derived key to encrypt ﬁle system meta-data, eﬀectively tying the encrypted
storage to a particular device [2]. Per-ﬁle keys are stored in this meta-data and used
to encrypt ﬁle contents. File keys can be wrapped with a UID derived key, or a
UID and password derived key, depending on the situation (e.g., if the ﬁle must be
opened while the device is locked, only a UID key is used). Unlike the transparency
aﬀorded by FDE, app developers must explicitly call the encryption API to protect
app data (beyond the default UID-key wrapping, which only protects the data if the
storage is removed and attacked without the device’s crypto processor) [99, 2]. The
advantage of ﬁle based encryption over FDE is that the device is actually encrypted
when the screen is locked (i.e., keys are wiped from RAM). This is not possible with
the current Android architecture, since background read/write operations would fail.
Older Android 2.3 (Gingerbread) devices can make use of third party software (e.g.,
WhisperCore [107]) to encrypt the device storage. WhisperCore enhances the raw
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ﬂash ﬁle system, YAFFS2, which has been superseded on current Android devices in
favour of the Ext4 ﬁle system.
Disk encryption software such as TrueCrypt [97] and FreeOTFE [31] use hidden
volumes for plausible deniability. TrueCrypt is an open source encryption system
available for Windows, Mac OS X, and GNU/Linux. The system is currently at
revision 7.1a and has been around since early 2004. The software complies with ISO,
NIST, FIPS, and PKCS standards and speciﬁcations. TrueCrypt oﬀers encryption
under several ciphers including AES, TwoFish, Serpent, and cascades of these ciphers
in the XTS mode. In addition to FDE, TrueCrypt also allows for mounting encrypted
ﬁle containers onto the ﬁlesystem. When encrypting a hard disk, TrueCrypt does not
alter the partition table. In this manner, there is no signature or indication of the
volume as being a TrueCrypt volume. TrueCrypt has withstood attacks (e.g., [75]),
suggesting that it is a robust FDE implementation. The open source model aﬀords
expert advice and scrutiny, and weaknesses that have been identiﬁed are quickly
rectiﬁed (e.g., PDE leakage issues [21]).
On Windows systems, TrueCrypt can encrypt the OS system partition. A special
boot loader is used to obtain the user’s password and decrypt the disk before the OS is
loaded. On Linux systems, similar functionality can be achieved using an early user-
space RAM disk (i.e., a temporary root ﬁlesystem). TrueCrypt does not perform this
conﬁguration, and requires the user to set up a RAM disk with the TrueCrypt binary
to capture the password and unlock the disk before the kernel attempts to mount the
actual root ﬁlesystem with the pivot root system call. The TrueCrypt boot-loader
(or RAM disk for Linux) is not encrypted and exposes the use of TrueCrypt to an
attacker. An alternative conﬁguration is to erase the boot-loader and volume key
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from the hard disk, and keep a copy of them on some external media (e.g., CD or
USB storage). This can be seen as a form of two-factor authentication, since both
the external media and user’s password are required to boot the system. Conﬁguring
the system in this way does not reveal the use of TrueCrypt: as there is no need for
an unencrypted boot-loader, the entire storage area will appear as random bytes.
System encryption with pre-boot authentication is not a straightforward solution
for Android devices, since the soft keyboard mechanism required to obtain the pass-
word is part of the OS framework and not immediately available on boot. A custom
boot-loader, implementing a soft keyboard, would be needed to capture the password
(cf. [90]). The dm-crypt volume could then be mounted before loading the Android
framework. However, since the OS partition is read-only on Android devices, it is
not encrypted. So we choose to work with the existing Android technique of partially
loading the framework to access the built-in keyboard. A custom boot-loader may
speed up the boot procedure, since the framework would not be required to mount
a tmpfs on /data while waiting for the user to enter their password. Mounting a
tmpfs incurs additional overhead to pivot the /data volume (unmount-then-mount),
but should not have any impact on security under our threat model.
TrueCrypt volumes contain a header at the very beginning of a volume. All
ﬁelds in the header are either random data (e.g., salt) or are encrypted, giving the
appearance of uniform random data for the entire volume. Unlike some other OTFE
frameworks, TrueCrypt does not store a hash of the passphrase (as with FreeOTFE),
nor the cipher speciﬁcation (as is stored in the Android footer) in the volume header.
Therefore, when a TrueCrypt volume is loaded, all supported ciphers and cascades
of ciphers, are tried until a certain block in the header decrypts to the ASCII string
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“TRUE”. The header key is derived from the user’s passphrase using PBKDF2. If
the header key successfully decrypts the ASCII string, then it is used to decrypt the
master volume key, which is chosen at random during the volume’s creation.
A secondary header, adjacent to the primary header, is used when a hidden volume
exists. The secondary header contains the same ﬁelds as the primary header, along
with the oﬀset to the hidden partition. When mounting a TrueCrypt volume, the
hidden header is tested before the primary header. To combat the OS/applications
leaking knowledge of hidden data (e.g., into logs, swap space, or temporary ﬁles) when
using hidden volumes, TrueCrypt recommends the use of a hidden OS. The hidden
OS is currently only an option for the Windows implementation. When encrypting
a system volume for use with PDE, TrueCrypt creates a second partition and copies
the currently installed OS to the hidden volume within. The user should only mount
hidden volumes when booted into a hidden OS, to ensure that any OS/application-
speciﬁc leakage stays within a deniable volume. When booted into a hidden OS,
all unencrypted volumes and non-hidden encrypted volumes are mounted read-only.
The alternative to a hidden OS for Linux is to use a live CD, when mounting hidden
volumes. A hidden OS is not necessary to prevent leakage in Mobiﬂage, since the
system volume on an Android device is mounted read-only and we attach hidden
volumes (or RAM disks) to all mutable volume mount-points.
There is a recent eﬀort to port TrueCrypt to Android [19]. The current version
(Dec. 2012) provides a command-line utility to create and mount TrueCrypt volume-
container ﬁles (for rooted devices with LVM and FUSE kernel support). Hidden
volumes are possible within these container ﬁles; but FDE/pre-boot authentication
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is not currently supported. Several leakage vectors also remain unaddressed (e.g.,
through ﬁle system structures, software logs, and network interfaces).
FreeOTFE [31] is another open source project that oﬀers FDE with PDE for Mi-
crosoft Windows. FreeOTFE does not currently implement a pre-boot authentication
mechanism, so it is important that the boot partition is not encrypted (as of Win-
dows Vista, this is a separate partition). The FreeOTFE volume header, known as the
critical data block, is encrypted with the user’s passphrase and contains the master
volume key for the volume image (along with other information about the encrypted
volume). Unlike TrueCrypt, FreeOTFE volumes can contain an arbitrary number of
hidden volumes. Each of these hidden volumes will have an associated oﬀset within
the outer volume. A hidden critical data block is written to this oﬀset, and the hidden
volume data immediately follows. The user is tasked with choosing the oﬀset to mark
the beginning of the hidden volume. The user must also remember these oﬀsets and
supply them when mounting the hidden volumes.
3.9.2 Deniable Storage Encryption Proposals
File encryption schemes with PDE support, called steganographic ﬁle systems, have
been ﬁrst proposed by Anderson et al. [1]. One of their solutions uses a series of cover
ﬁles initially ﬁlled with random data, and assumes the attacker has no knowledge
of the plaintext content of a ﬁle. The hidden ﬁles are embedded by modifying and
XORing a linear combination of some cover ﬁles. The password and ﬁle name are used
to determine which cover ﬁles are used. This solution requires storing a large number
of cover ﬁles (e.g., 1000); also, these ﬁles must be relatively large to accommodate ﬁles
of arbitrary length. The second solution [1] is built on existing block ciphers. The
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disk is initially ﬁlled with random data. Files are then stored at disk block addresses
derived from the ﬁle name and password (e.g., using a hash function). The ﬁles are
encrypted with a key derived in a similar manner. An adversary would not be able
to distinguish between empty blocks and blocks containing hidden ﬁles. However, as
discussed [1], the probability of ﬁle blocks colliding increases as disk blocks are ﬁlled.
As a mitigation, writing each block to several disk locations has been suggested.
However, high storage and IO overhead of these solutions make them less suitable for
performance-sensitive mobile devices.
StegFS [62] is an Ext2 based ﬁle system inspired by the second approach of Ander-
son et al. [1]. It uses several security levels (up to 15), each with a separate password.
Its deniability relies on how many levels of hidden ﬁles are present, not on denying
the fact that hidden ﬁles exist. An external block allocation table (stored in the non-
deniable disk space) with entries for each disk block is used. When a given security
level is closed, there is no way to prevent overwriting that level’s blocks, so redundant
blocks are used to mitigate collisions. The existence of the modiﬁed Ext2 driver, and
the external block table, would indicate that PDE is in use. The project website7
explains that only 6% of the storage space can actually be used for ﬁle storage, as the
rest is used for meta-data and collision avoidance. Also, as hidden and regular ﬁles
are present on the same ﬁle system, data leakage may occur when security levels are
open.
Other StegFS-based systems improve eﬃciency and reliability of the original im-
plementation. Pang et al. [70] design a system where blocks used by hidden ﬁles are
in fact marked as occupied in the block bitmap. This alleviates reliability issues and
7StegFS https://albinoloverats.net/projects/stegfs
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IO ineﬃciencies, as storing multiple copies of a block is not required. Hidden ﬁles do
not have a directory record in the standard inode table. Since the blocks are marked
as used, but not referenced in a directory entry, the adversary can conjecture that
hidden ﬁles exist. The adversary can also estimate the amount of disk space uti-
lized by hidden ﬁles. Three mechanisms are used to frustrate such estimation. Some
empty or “abandoned” blocks are marked as used even though they do not contain
hidden data. When a new hidden ﬁle is created, several blocks are allocated that are
not actually ﬁlled with ﬁle data. Dummy hidden ﬁles are created and periodically
updated in the background to prevent snapshot analysis from determining the exact
blocks used by hidden ﬁles. These mechanisms make it more diﬃcult to determine
which blocks actually store hidden data, but are not disk space eﬃcient.
Further work [112] expands the above idea by adding dummy transactions to
obscure hidden ﬁles in network/cloud storage. This improves reliability and IO ef-
ﬁciency, but disk space utilization for dummy ﬁles and abandoned blocks remains a
concern, especially for resource constrained mobile devices. Also, strong deniability
cannot be oﬀered as the adversary is aware that hidden ﬁles exist. Deniability is a
result of an adversary being unable to determine how much space is used by hidden
ﬁles.
The dummy-relocatable steganographic (DRSteg [38]) ﬁle system is proposed for
use in multi-user environments. DRSteg adds dynamic updating to dummy ﬁles to
prevent snapshot analysis. When coerced, a user can provide some of their hidden ﬁle
passwords and blame the additional hidden storage on dummy ﬁles and other users’
hidden ﬁles. However, the adversary is still aware that hidden ﬁles exist.
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Other Linux deniable implementations, such as RubberhoseFS [3], and Magikfs,8
employ techniques similar to StegFS for hiding data in ﬁle system free space. Several
of these projects are no longer maintained and existing implementations are also
mostly incompatible with the modern Linux OS. The presence of specialized ﬁle
system drivers designed to hide data would be a red ﬂag to an adversary.
3.10 Concluding Remarks
Mobile devices are increasingly being used for capturing and spreading images of pop-
ular uprisings and civil disobedience. To keep such records hidden from authorities,
deniable storage encryption may oﬀer a viable technical solution. Such PDE-enabled
storage systems exist for mainstream desktop/laptop operating systems. With Mob-
iﬂage, we explore design and implementation challenges of PDE for mobile devices,
which may be more useful to regular users and human rights activists. Mobiﬂage’s
design is partly based on the lessons learned from known attacks and weaknesses
of desktop PDE solutions. We also consider unique challenges in the mobile envi-
ronment (such as ISP or wireless carrier collusion with the adversary). To address
some of these challenges, we need the user to comply with certain requirements. We
compiled a list of rules the user must follow to prevent leakage of information that
may weaken deniability. Even if users follow all these guidelines, we do not claim
that Mobiﬂage’s design is completely safe against any leaks (cf. [21]). We want to
avoid giving any false sense of security. We present Mobiﬂage here to encourage
further investigation of PDE-enabled mobile systems. Source code of our prototype




Myphrase: Strong Multiword Passwords
This chapter describes a multi-word password scheme that aims to improve mem-
orability and strength of user-chosen passwords. In our Myphrase scheme, a small
dictionary is created from user-authored content such as sent emails and blogs. A
master passphrase is constructed by randomly selecting words from the dictionary.
Words in the passphrase are expected to be memorable to users and can be eﬃciently
entered by leveraging the auto-suggest feature. Myphrase is discussed here in the
context of web applications, as that provides an easy framework for evaluation and
comparison against other authentication schemes. Myphrase passphrases oﬀer bet-
ter complexity than most user-chosen passwords, and as such Myphrase is a suitable
key-protection mechanism. Our Android prototype can be used with Mobiﬂage (see
Chapter 3), to provide strong protection for PDE keys.
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
To the dismay of security proponents and website administrators, many regular and
expert users consistently choose weak passwords, such as, 123456, iloveyou, ieee2012,
and princess (see e.g., leaked passwords from IEEE.org [26] and Rockyou.com [44]).
Most users do not understand the security implications of choosing a password; pass-
words are just words with which they can get access to their digital resources. Thus,
it is unsurprising that currently, common dictionary words and their predictable vari-
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ants are heavily used as passwords. For users, this is apparently the most sensible
choice for password creation and long-term management [39]. To exploit this be-
havior, oﬄine and online password guessing attacks use common passwords as their
starting point. To restrict these attacks, some websites forbid certain obvious pass-
words; see e.g., Twitter [91]. Password authentication is so deeply entrenched in
modern technology that digital providers are reluctant to adopt new back-end secu-
rity mechanisms. Most sites enforce password rules to restrain users from choosing
passwords they desire; often these rules are too complex for users to cope with [45].
On the other hand, to facilitate user choice, Schechter et al. [84] suggested to place a
threshold in the use of popular passwords; users are free to choose any password as
long as that password has not been chosen by too many other users of the website.
This may reduce the total number of compromised accounts on a given site, but does
not protect the individuals that choose weak passwords.
Password entry from constrained input interfaces of mobile devices may further
inﬂuence users to choose dictionary words as passwords (cf. [48]). Recently, multi-
word password schemes have been revisited as an alternative to regular passwords by
leveraging auto-correct and auto-suggest features in mobile devices [16, 47]. However,
as long as users are free to choose words in a multi-word phrase, no signiﬁcant im-
provement is apparent in password strength (see e.g., [59, 11, 104, 85]). In terms of
usability, non-text authentication solutions for mobile devices have also been proposed
(e.g., implicit authentication [48]). However, as many users access their password-
protected accounts from both traditional computers and mobile devices, new solutions
must consider both environments.
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With Myphrase, we explore a diﬀerent approach, which is apparently more in-
line with user desire and can support both desktop and mobile platforms. Instead
of discouraging users from choosing what they are comfortable with, we leverage
users’ own personal vocabulary to generate strong passwords; i.e., any words can be
used irrespective of being considered too obvious or taboo. A Myphrase passphrase
consists of multiple randomly chosen words from a user-created/selected dictionary.
The dictionary is user-speciﬁc, e.g., generated from user-created text content, such as
emails; users may also choose a pre-generated dictionary aligned with their interests
e.g., lexicon from a favorite poet. Users can even use a list of common passwords as
their dictionary, e.g., the 3546-word John the Ripper most common password list.1
Dictionaries need not be private.
We examine two variations for passphrase construction. The ﬁrst variant, called
Random Sequence (RS), randomly selects words without regard for syntax. For an
expected level of entropy, the required number of words in an RS-passphrase can be
easily set; e.g., for 60 bits of entropy, six words must be chosen from a 1024-word dic-
tionary. Memorability of RS-phrases is expected to beneﬁt from the user’s familiarity
with the words (i.e., frequency of occurrence/use; cf. [82, 42, 35]). The second variant,
called Connected Discourse (CD), constructs proper sentences using rudimentary nat-
ural language processing (NLP). Dictionary words are tagged using a part-of-speech
(POS) engine, and inserted into pre-created sentence templates (cf. Mad Libs [73]).
Calculating entropy for this variant is not as straightforward as the RS variant; en-
tropy depends on the selected sentence template and the breakdown of words in each
POS category from the dictionary. Memorability of CD-phrases is expected to beneﬁt
1http://www.openwall.com/passwords/wordlists/password-2011.lst
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from high-order syntactic and semantic structures (cf. [63, 25, 60, 29, 61]), in addition
to word familiarity.
To reduce memory load, we expect users to memorize only one Myphrase master
passphrase, and use it across multiple websites. A site password is generated by
salting the phrase with the site’s URL domain; the salted password is also hashed
and converted into a server-compatible password (e.g., consisting of alphanumeric
characters only).
We test Myphrase by creating dictionaries for users in the Enron email corpus
and authors from Project Gutenberg. We ﬁnd that our frequency ranked dictionaries
have similar POS break-down, as compared to text parsed from a large collection of
prose. We also compare the similarity between user’s dictionaries to determine how
personal or unique they are. We used these ﬁndings to identify sentence templates
that maximize a passphrase’s complexity.
In summary, Myphrase oﬀers the following beneﬁts.
1. Passphrase from user-specific words: Myphrase introduces a middle-
ground between conﬂicting choices for text passwords: machine-generated
(strong but memory-unfriendly), and user-chosen (memory-friendly but weak).
Myphrase phrases are machine generated but consist of a user’s personally-
meaningful words; these passphrases are expected to be both memory-friendly
and strong.
2. Stronger passwords: To restrict oﬄine attacks, Myphrase passwords oﬀer
a signiﬁcant entropy gain; e.g., 60 bits in Myphrase’s default setting (cf. an
estimated 10-20 bits of entropy in current passwords [9]). Passwords are also
further strengthened using the PBKDF2 key-stretching function by a factor of
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215. The exact entropy of Myphrase passwords can easily be determined for the
RS variant and closely approximated for the CD variant. Entropy of user-chosen
passwords can at best be roughly estimated (see e.g., [14, 105]).
3. Scalable and resilient to site-password leaks: Users need to memo-
rize only one Myphrase master passphrase and can use it for all web logins—
irrespective of varying levels of site security. If a site-password is leaked from
the server-side, the user can update only that password, while maintaining their
master passphrase and all other site-passwords.
4. Cross-platform/device compatibility: Auto-suggesting words after typ-
ing (or tapping) a couple of characters may reduce the input time of the
passphrase; such a feature makes Myphrase suitable for mobile devices with
a constrained/touch-based keyboard. We have implemented proof-of-concept
prototypes for both desktop and mobile platforms.
Additionally, Myphrase passwords are resilient to phishing attacks. Attackers get
a password speciﬁc to their phishing domain, instead of the target domain; they also
do not receive the master passphrase. These beneﬁts of Myphrase and limitations are
explained further in Section 4.5.
4.2 Myphrase Description
Below we describe Myphrase, including our assumptions and user steps.
Operational and threat model assumptions. The custom dictionary can be
generated from diﬀerent types of user content, such as: (a) user-authored content,
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e.g., sent emails, tweeted messages, blog posts, comments at social networking sites,
academic papers, and other such documents; and (b) user-liked content, e.g., favorite
ebooks, song lyrics, and emails from certain contacts. Alternatively, users may select
a pre-generated dictionary according to their interests or familiarity such as: an
urban dictionary, medical or technology dictionary. For the connected discourse (CD)
variant of Myphrase, the dictionary must contain the following POS categories: nouns,
verbs, adjectives and adverbs. However, the random sequence (RS) variant has no
such constraints (e.g., the dictionary may be comprised entirely of nouns, as in names
of cities or ﬁlm actors). The dictionary itself and sources of the dictionary words are
not security-sensitive, and can be made public. However, the dictionary may be
privacy-sensitive, if users do not want to reveal that certain words appear in their
dictionary.
We assume that words in the created/selected personal dictionary are familiar
enough to users that they can memorize a relatively long sequence (e.g., six) of these
words as their master passphrase; see Section 4.5.4 for a discussion on memorability.
To make use of auto-suggest, for minimal typing and easy recognition, Myphrase
requires the dictionary be available in all user devices (e.g., via manual copy, email
attachment, browser sync mechanisms or web hosting). The dictionary can be re-
created from previously selected sources. Similar to regular passwords, the Myphrase
master passphrase is vulnerable to host malware and shoulder-surﬁng attacks; such
attacks are out-of-scope.
Myphrase design. When constructing the user’s dictionary, we rank words by
occurrence and keep only the most frequently used words. During this operation,
we omit 215 common conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and pronouns (e.g., ‘at’,
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‘and’, ‘she’) from the frequency ranking, and append them to the dictionary be-
fore passphrase generation. These words are necessary parts-of-speech, and must be
present regardless of their observed frequencies (for the CD variant). Conversely, these
parts-of-speech tend to be over-represented in a user’s dictionary, as compared to the
POS breakdown observed in a large collection of prose. Removing these words from
the frequency ranking should allow us to capture more personally meaningful, and
hopefully memorable, words from the input. This also allows us to more accurately
estimate the entropy for a given CD passphrase; see Section 4.5.1. We experimented
with diﬀerent lists of common words ranging from 100 to 1000. We found that 215
was the optimal size to ensure enough variation was available for the CD sentence
templates, and balance dictionary POS break-down and passphrase entropy.
In Myphrase, passphrases are generated by randomly selecting words from the
user’s vocabulary in the following ways. (i) Random sequence: n words are randomly
selected from the user’s dictionary. (ii) Connected discourse: words are classiﬁed
based on their POS tag (e.g., verb, noun); an n word-long sentence template is
randomly selected from a pool of pre-created templates; dictionary words are then
randomly chosen for each position in the template, based on their POS class.2 The
value of n depends on the dictionary size and expected level of entropy. Currently,
we recommend that the passphrase oﬀer at least 60 bits of entropy to restrict oﬄine
dictionary attacks; e.g., n = 6 for a 1024-word dictionary for the RS variant. The
entropy for a CD passphrase cannot be directly calculated. Through experimenta-
tion we found that the complexity of a CD-phrase is roughly 65% of an equivalent
2This variant resembles the popular word game Mad Libs [73], in which players in turn choose
words of particular types to fill-in the blanks of a given sentence template. However, there are no
fixed words in our templates, and all words are chosen randomly from a user’s vocabulary.
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length RS-phrase, so n = 8 words from a 4096-word dictionary is recommended; see
Section 4.5.1 for details.
Speciﬁc words in the generated passphrase can be indicated for replacement, and
Myphrase will oﬀer another random word. However, entropy of the phrase may suﬀer,
depending on the dictionary size and the number of iterations used for a speciﬁc word.
We limit the loss of entropy by restricting the number of times a user may selectively
regenerate words in the phrase to n, e.g., 8 times for an 8 word passphrase; see
Section 4.5.2.
The master passphrase is used to generate unique site-speciﬁc passwords as follows:
pwd = Hash2Text(hi(passphrase||domain||updatecount)) (4.1)
Here, h is a cryptographic hash/key-stretching function, e.g., SHA-1 or PBKDF2;
i is the number of hash iterations e.g., i = 32768; and updatecount is the number
of updates made to a speciﬁc site’s password (by default updatecount = 0, see also
“Updating site passwords” below). A higher value of i will make brute-force attacks
on the passphrase more computationally intensive, but values that are too high may
slow down password generation. To increase the cost of oﬄine cracking attacks, we
use PBKDF2 in our implementation, which is more complex than SHA-1 alone, when
implemented in a custom circuit. Recently proposed computational and memory-wise
expensive functions can also be used (e.g., [58, 71]). The Hash2Text function encodes
the binary hash result into a server-compatible password, e.g., passwords with only
alphanumeric characters; cf. PwdHash [80].
User steps: dictionary and master passphrase generation. The following steps




move seem hence wish cave fool
Passphrase




they traced again and loudly radiantconnecteddiscourse
Figure 4.1: Myphrase basic mechanism with RS and CD variants
word sources for their custom word dictionary, e.g., emails, and ebooks. (b) The
Myphrase tool extracts words from these sources, ranks the words by frequency, and
selects a pre-speciﬁed number (e.g., 2048) of the most frequent words as the dictionary.
After creation, users may choose to manually update the words in their dictionary.
(c) The tool creates a multi-word passphrase from the dictionary created in the
previous step (or a pre-selected dictionary) using the RS or CD variant. (d) Users
can continue generating new phrases until they are satisﬁed. When the user is satisﬁed
with a passphrase, she is expected to memorize the word sequence verbatim, or to
write it down in a secure place, (cf. [111, 40]). The exact spelling of words need not
be memorized due to the auto-suggest feature of Myphrase. However, users must not
rearrange the words in a phrase, as such modiﬁcations may reduce eﬀective entropy.
User steps: site-specific password generation. (a) Users enter their passphrase;
assuming the dictionary is available as a browser add-on or with the Myphrase appli-
cation, users need to type only the ﬁrst couple of characters for each word and then
select the correct word from the auto-suggestion list. (b) The site-speciﬁc password
is created using the formula shown in Equation 4.1. The site password is sent to the
authenticating site.
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Updating site passwords. Users may want to update their Myphrase site pass-
words for various reasons, including a periodic password update policy, and passwords
compromised at server-side (e.g., LinkedIn’s 6.5M password leak [6]). We allow pass-
word update without requiring the master passphrase to be changed, by increasing
the value of updatecount (see the site-password generation formula in Equation 4.1).
This value is site-speciﬁc and starts from zero; when a site’s password needs to be
updated, updatecount is incremented by one, and the updated value is used only for
the target site (i.e., other site passwords will still be generated with updatecount = 0,
if not already changed). This solution is similar to the index mechanism as proposed
by Halderman et al. [37]. Site URLs with updated count values must be stored and
synced across devices; e.g., via Firefox Sync.
4.3 Implementation
We implemented Myphrase for PCs as a Firefox addon, and for Android devices as
a custom soft-keyboard. The desktop version provides an interface to build dictio-
naries, generate passphrases, and insert site passwords. The mobile version currently
makes use of dictionaries and passphrases generated in the desktop version to insert
passwords into websites. A web interface is also created to facilitate password genera-
tion when other tools are unavailable (e.g., a temporary device). We currently handle
only English words; internationalization would require POS taggers for additional
languages. Details are discussed below.
Preferences. The Firefox addon oﬀers a few user customizable settings; see Fig-
ure 4.2. We provide some pre-built dictionaries, but encourage users to create per-
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Figure 4.2: Myphrase preferences
sonalized ones. To help guide the user experience, we provide the following default
options: (a) type of master passphrase: connected discourse; (b) dictionary: lexicon
from the works of H. G. Wells; (c) length of master passphrase: eight words; (d) size of
custom dictionary: 4096 words; and (e) maximum word length: 14 characters. The
addon also has site-speciﬁc settings for each generated site password. These allow
Myphrase to conform to provider speciﬁc constraints, and store each site’s password
update count. The defaults are as follows: (a) length of site passwords: 12; (b) special
characters: disabled; and (c) password update count: 0.
Dictionary construction. The Firefox addon can build a personal dictionary from
the user’s outbound emails, and plain-text, HTML and XML ﬁles. Our text and
HTML/XML parsers can be used to build dictionaries from PDF and other document
formats after saving as text, ebooks (e.g., ePub, a compressed XML format), and
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web content saved as HTML. For email parsing, we choose to collect messages from
the Simple Mail Firefox addon [92], which enables managing several email accounts,
including POP/IMAP exposed webmails. It aggregates emails across accounts in
a single folder structure (i.e., emails sent from all accounts are stored in one “Sent”
folder). This allows us to gather words that may originate from disparate vocabularies
(e.g., work emails with professional terms vs. personal emails with slang or informal
words). Sent messages are collected by querying an SQLite database. The message
text is parsed to extract the user’s original text; i.e., we eliminate quoted text from
forwarded or replied emails.
Using a series of regular expressions, we decode HTML/XML entities and elimi-
nate mark-up, punctuation, digits, and other non-word strings. By default, we cap-
ture strings that are 14 characters or less. Note that short words do not compromise
the security of Myphrase; however, longer words may require more typing if the user’s
dictionary is not available for auto-suggest completion.
We retain the top 4096 words in the user’s dictionary by default. All characters are
reduced to lower-case before the word frequency analysis. The dictionary is saved as
a text ﬁle, which the user may further customize (manually). Users may also choose
to use a pre-built dictionary; we provide a few default dictionaries created using top
free ebooks from Project Gutenberg.
Master passphrase generation. After selecting a dictionary, users can generate
a passphrase in the Firefox addon. To select random words from the dictionary, we
use Mozilla’s PRNG, nsIRandomGenerator (assumed to be cryptographically secure;
uses mouse movement events within the Firefox window). For the RS variant, a
passphrase is generated simply by selecting n random words from the dictionary. For
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the CD variant, we ﬁrst randomly choose a pre-built sentence template for the given
passphrase length (n = 4 to 12 words). A number of templates were created by parsing
top free ebooks from Project Gutenberg, and selecting a few which appear to yield
high entropy passphrases (discussed more in Section 4.5.1). We then use a Javascript
POS tagger [101] to classify the dictionary words. A passphrase is generated by
ﬁlling the template with randomly selected words from the classes that appear in
the template. For both variants, users can regenerate new phrases until they are
satisﬁed; a limited number of selective regeneration of words in a selected phrase is
also allowed. The master passphrase is not stored within our software, and cannot
be regenerated; users are expected to memorize it.
Site password generation. We anticipate that users will build personal dictionaries
and generate passphrases only occasionally. The day-to-day use of Myphrase will
largely consist of deriving site passwords. When faced with a login page, the user
right-clicks on the password ﬁeld and selects the Myphrase insert option from the
browser context menu. On a mobile device, the user can pull down the notiﬁcation
bar, to switch from their default keyboard to the Myphrase keyboard; see Figure 4.3.
The user is then prompted to enter her master passphrase. The prompt allows the
user to view the passphrase text, or have it shadowed in the case she is in a public
place. An auto-complete suggestion list is populated with words from the user’s
dictionary to speed up this task; see Figure. 4.4. This feature is especially useful
on mobile devices where typing tends to be slower. Passphrases are constructed
in such a way that the user will not require any modiﬁers (e.g., shift) or changing
keyboard views (e.g., numbers, special characters) which should greatly increase entry
time for mobile devices. At this stage, the user can also set site-speciﬁc constraints
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Figure 4.3: Myphrase mobile keyboard; the auto-complete suggestions are visible above the
keys
Figure 4.4: Myphrase site password generation – Firefox addon
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(e.g., password length) and increment the update counter. The update count and
constraints for each domain are saved as site speciﬁc preference within Firefox and
Android, so will only need to be set by the user once.
We then iterate the PBKDF2 HMAC SHA-1 function 32768 times, using the
passphrase as the HMAC secret, and the site’s domain and update count as the salt;
see Equation 4.1. The choice of our iteration count is explained in Section 4.5.2. The
result is then encoded into a compatible password and inserted in the password ﬁeld.
Note that, both the addon and Android soft-keyboard make only the site-password
available to the authenticating domain, which could be a legitimate or phishing site.
The master passphrase remains inaccessible to all websites.
Myphrase mobile. We implemented Myphrase for Android devices as a custom soft-
keyboard. This enables Myphrase authentication for any password ﬁeld on the device
including websites, apps and even device unlock; the current prototype implementa-
tion supports only website login with the full feature set. Users can quickly switch to
the Myphrase keyboard from the Android notiﬁcation bar to enter a password. For
the Android/Mobiﬂage pre-boot authentication mechanism, the application package
must be installed as part of the system framework, as opposed to installation in the
user application store. The user’s text is displayed above the keyboard while they
are typing, but not entered into the password ﬁeld until they press Enter. As with
the desktop software, auto-complete dictionary suggestions are displayed to speed
up passphrase entry. The auto-complete feature can only be made available to the
pre-boot authenticator when an unencrypted SD card is present (i.e., auto-complete
suggestions are not available during pre-boot for Mobiﬂage encrypted devices). Af-
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ter the boot process, the dictionary is available for all other authentication attempts
(e.g., web sites and apps).
4.4 Related Work
Multi-word passwords and several-related variants including ﬁrst-letter mnemonics
have been proposed decades ago (see e.g., [5, 72, 59]). Similar schemes have been
recently revived to increase password entropy,3 and to make password input more
user-friendly in devices with touch-screen keypads [16, 47]. The use of readily available
auto-correct and auto-suggest features can signiﬁcantly reduce input issues in these
devices (e.g., compared to inputting a password with mixed case letters and special
characters). Generally, there are two types of multi-word passwords: words and their
sequence chosen by a user (e.g., [72, 47]), and words selected randomly from a ﬁxed,
system-chosen dictionary (e.g., Cheswick [16]). Cheswick’s proposal uses a 1020-
word dictionary of iPhone-friendly English words. Diceware [76] is another random
passphrase generator using one or more dice as the random number generator. Each
word in the phrase is chosen from a ﬁve digit number generated by ﬁve rolls of a die.
Any list of 7776 (65) unique words can be used; word lists are currently available in
several languages.
Smith proposed a word association authentication scheme [89] that requires users
to register a list of (cue, response) pairs consisting of personally-meaningful words;
obvious pairs such as (black, white) are disallowed. During login, users must provide
correct responses to cues chosen randomly by the system. As cues and responses are
user-selected and likely to vary signiﬁcantly from user to user, Smith argues that this
3For example, see the popular XKCD cartoon at http://xkcd.com/936/.
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scheme would oﬀer adequate beneﬁts in terms of user-acceptance, memorability and
security.
The use of natural language processing techniques to create multi-word passwords
has also been explored. Atallah et al. [4] generate a meaningful/humorous phrase and
associated mnemonic for authentication. Another technique [50] creates sentences for
a given random password. News headlines are used as templates by substituting sim-
ilar words; several variants of the same sentence are generated using a POS tagger
and WordNet [65]. To generate multiple passwords from a master mnemonic sen-
tence, Topkara et al. [95] propose to split a password into two parts: a memorized
mnemonic sentence that is used to perform a table-lookup on a helper-card to derive
site passwords.
User-chosen phrases or word sequences are almost as memorable as regular pass-
words [109]; it has long been known that memorability of a sequence of items such as
words or phonemes is dependent on familiarity of those items [64, 42, 35]. However,
such phrases do not oﬀer much improvement in terms of entropy as users generally
choose common phrases; see e.g., Kuo et al. [59]. Another recent analysis of over
100, 000 possible user-selected passphrases from the Amazon PayPhrase system also
reported similar results [11]. Generic attack techniques against multi-word passwords
have also been proposed; see e.g., Weir [104], Schmitz [85]. In contrast, random words
from a system-chosen dictionary oﬀer better entropy, but may not be ideal in terms
of memorability. We allow users to reuse the same passphrase safely for all web lo-
gins, reducing their memory load and combating the multiple password interference
problem [17].
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4.5 Comparison and Evaluation
In this section, we discuss entropy of passphrases for both RS- and CD-Myphrase
variants, memorability of the passphrases and limitations of the scheme. We also
use a slightly modiﬁed version of the recently-proposed UDS (usability, deployability,
security) framework [10] for an analytical evaluation of Myphrase.
4.5.1 Myphrase Entropy Estimation
Equal-length CD-phrases will provide a lower entropy count than RS-phrases, as each
template element is being chosen from a subset of the dictionary words. Experimental
entropy estimation of CD-phrases is discussed below. We also allow selective regen-
eration of words in a phrase. By keeping the regeneration count small, we can limit
the loss of entropy. We provide an analysis of selective regeneration and estimated
eﬀorts required to launch brute-force guessing attacks against Myphrase passwords
in Section 4.5.2.
By default, we expect users to choose six words from a 1024-word dictionary for the
RS variant (providing 60 bits of entropy), and eight words from a 4096-word dictionary
for the CD variant (providing 60 bits of entropy on average). For easy memorization,
users may want to reduce the word count, especially for the RS variant (e.g., three
words). This may still provide higher entropy than current passwords (cf. 10-20 bits
of entropy as found in a large-scale password study [9]). However, such a three-word
master password can be practically retrieved from a leaked site password; this may
mandate changing all site passwords. If the adversary has the user dictionary, he can
attempt all 3 word combinations until he ﬁnds a match with the leaked site password.
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On average, this will require 229 attempts. Without the dictionary, he will need to
brute force lower-case strings of indeterminable length (the worst case scenario is
3 one-letter words, which only provides about 14 bits of entropy). As high-impact
password leaks happen not so rarely (e.g., [26, 6, 88]), we suggest users to invest in a
longer master passphrase. Creating a larger dictionary will also increase the eﬀective
complexity of the passphrase.
Experimental entropy estimation of the CD-Myphrase variant. We obtain
real world entropy estimates of CD-phrases by examining the POS breakdown for
two datasets: Enron emails (from www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/) and Project Gutenberg
ebooks. We also test similarity between user dictionaries.
To generate sentence templates, we parse the 25 most popular ebooks from Project
Gutenberg between the period of Aug. 29–Sept. 28, 2012. We identify 60, 921 unique
strings. The POS class breakdown is as follows: nouns (71%), verbs (18%), adjectives
(7%), adverbs (3%), and others (1%). We then select sentence templates from the
parsed text, capitalizing on sentences that contained more of the highly populated
POS classes. We originally chose ten templates for each possible passphrase length
(4 to 12 words) that we believed would yield high entropy phrases; after evaluation,
we retain the 7 highest performing templates for each length. The sentence templates
used in the 8-word Myphrase connected discourse variant are listed in Table 4.1.
When constructing a user’s dictionary we rank words by frequency and select
only the most common words in the user’s vocabulary. This could skew the user’s
POS breakdown in such a way that our selected templates would not produce ideal
passphrases (e.g., if the frequency ranked dictionaries contain more verbs than nouns).
We chose to analyze the Myphrase dictionaries for selected ebook authors and Enron
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〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈IN〉 〈DT〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈IN〉 〈NN〉
〈DT〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈RB〉 〈VB〉 〈IN〉 〈DT〉 〈NN〉
〈NN〉 〈CC〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈RB〉 〈IN〉 〈DT〉 〈NN〉
〈IN〉 〈PRP〉 〈VB〉 〈RB〉 〈PRP$〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈RB〉
〈DT〉 〈JJ〉 〈NN〉 〈RB〉 〈VB〉 〈TO〉 〈DT〉 〈NN〉
〈RB〉 〈VB〉 〈JJ〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈TO〉 〈DT〉 〈NN〉
〈CC〉 〈PRP$〉 〈VB〉 〈JJ〉 〈NN〉 〈VB〉 〈VB〉 〈PRP$〉
Table 4.1: Myphrase 8-word connected discourse templates; where 〈NN〉 is a noun, 〈VB〉
is a verb, 〈IN〉 is a preposition, 〈DT〉 is a determiner, 〈RB〉 is an adverb, 〈CC〉 is a con-
junction, 〈JJ〉 is an adjective, 〈PRP〉 is a pronoun, 〈PRP$〉 is a possessive pronoun, and
〈TO〉 is the word “to”.
employee emails. For ebooks, we choose 7–10 well-known works from ten authors. The
Enron email corpus contains 150 unique user accounts. We isolate each user’s personal
vocabulary by parsing only sent emails after eliminating quoted text, signature blocks,
etc. There were only 15 users with dictionaries of at least 4096 words (we also
discarded 2 dictionaries containing several anomalies, e.g., mid-word line-breaks). We
found both the Enron employees and ebook authors had similar POS breakdowns in
their frequency adjusted dictionaries, validating our template selections; see Table 4.2.
We also noticed earlier that some parts-of-speech (e.g., conjunctions, pronouns) were
over-represented; consequently, we remove the 215 common words from those classes
before frequency ranking the list.
Composition %
Gutenberg authors Enron authors
Avg Stdev Avg Stdev
Nouns 50.29 1.94 63.31 2.84
Verbs 29.27 1.77 22.68 1.70
Adjectives 14.19 0.98 9.16 0.85
Adverbs 6.06 0.60 4.44 0.45
Others 0.19 0.12 0.41 0.08
Table 4.2: Frequency adjusted POS classification for 4096-word popular Project Gutenberg
author dictionaries (N=10) and Enron dictionaries (N=15)
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Entropy count in bits
Gutenberg authors Enron authors
Length Min Max Avg Stdev Min Max Avg Stdev
6 words 41.5 57.5 47.8 5.4 41.2 57.0 47.0 5.4
7 words 47.7 62.6 54.9 4.7 46.5 61.5 53.7 4.4
8 words 58.1 71.0 63.9 3.9 57.2 71.2 63.1 4.4
Table 4.3: Observed entropy for phrases from 4096-word Gutenberg and Enron dictionaries.
Large deviation is a result of different templates. Each template has little variability as seen
in Table 4.4.
We then used the created Myphrase dictionaries to calculate expected entropy
from each template. Entropy for RS passphrases can be directly calculated, e.g., six
words from a 1024-word dictionary will result in: log2(1024
6) = 60 bits. The entropy
of a CD passphrase depends on the template and POS breakdown of the user’s dic-
tionary. For example, assume the chosen template is: “noun verb adverb determiner
noun verb preposition noun” with POS class sizes (noun, 1975), (verb, 1209), (ad-
verb, 86), (determiner, 21), (preposition, 86). A randomly generated passphrase from
this template will provide an entropy of log2(1975× 1209× 86× 21× 1975× 1209×
86× 1975) = 70.57. We performed the calculations on 6, 7, and 8 word phrases – see
Table 4.3; on average, these CD phrases retain about 65% of the entropy compared
to RS-phrases of respective lengths. The large deviations are a result of the diﬀerent
templates within a given phrase length. The templates provided similar results re-
gardless of the dictionary used. This would suggest that we can further narrow the
entropy estimate for a given phrase length by adjusting the templates rather than
the dictionary. For example, template ﬁve for eight word phrases (see Table 4.1)
performed the worst, and could be eliminated. The results of 8-word templates are
shown in Table 4.4.
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Template Avg Stdev % of RS
1 71 0.17 72
2 66 0.32 68
3 66 0.12 68
4 61 0.83 63
5 58 0.44 60
6 63 0.64 66
7 60 0.94 62
Table 4.4: Observed entropy for 8-word templates; combined results from both Enron and
Gutenberg authors (N=25).
Dictionary uniqueness. We also compared the similarity between the dictionaries
to measure how unique they were to each user. For every pair of user dictionaries
in both Gutenberg and Enron datasets, we calculated the Jaccard index (i.e., the
size of the intersection between two dictionaries divided by the size of their union);
see Table 4.5. The results show that each user dictionary is relatively personal (the
average similarity is between 31-43%).
4.5.2 Selective Regeneration and Brute-force Attacks
Selective regeneration of words. The user is allowed to selectively regenerate
individual words in the passphrase; see Figure 4.5. Each time the user discards a word
they reduce the available choices and weaken the passphrase. We restrict the number
of re-selections to the number of words in the phrase (e.g., the user can regenerate 6
Jaccard index %
Min Max Avg Stdev
Gutenberg 34.84 49.59 42.58 3.62
Enron 23.38 41.82 30.52 3.48
Table 4.5: Similarity of user dictionaries (measured as Jaccard index of pairs of users
from both Gutenberg and Enron datasets)
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Figure 4.5: Myphrase passphrase generation with selective regeneration of individual words
words when constructing an 6 word passphrase) in order to ensure the user does not
introduce too much predictability. For example, if a RS passphrase consists of six
words from a 1024-word dictionary then the entropy will be: log2(1024
6) = 60. If the
user selectively regenerates six words, the entropy is reduced to: log2(1018
6) = 59.95.
Since only a few iterations are allowed, the entropy will not suﬀer signiﬁcantly. If
the user ﬁnds many undesirable words, it would be appropriate for them to consider
creating a new dictionary from diﬀerent sources.
The selective regeneration feature will probably be more useful for the CD vari-
ant. Some selected words will not create coherent sentences. A user is more likely
to reject these words, which decreases the available combinations for that template.
For example, assume the chosen template is: “noun verb adverb determiner noun
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verb preposition noun” with POS class sizes (noun, 1975), (verb, 1209), (adverb,
86), (determiner, 21), (preposition, 86). A randomly generated passphrase from this
template, e.g., “discomfort rang down the sunlight wait of freedom” will provide an
entropy of log2(1975 × 1209 × 86 × 21 × 1975 × 1209 × 86 × 1975) = 70.57 bits.
Assume the user regenerates the following words: (discomfort→clamor), (the→a),
(sunlight→heap→yelp→spirit) and (wait→answering→alter→contrived). Now the
sentence becomes: “clamor rang down a spirit contrived of freedom” and the modi-
ﬁed entropy is: log2(1971× 1206× 86× 20× 1971× 1206× 86× 1971) = 70.48 bits.
As appears from this example, after a few iterations, the sentence may converge to
something acceptable to the user, without losing much entropy. However, if an at-
tacker uses sophisticated natural language processing, they may be able to determine
which words are more likely to be rejected, thereby narrowing their search space. A
larger dictionary can help oﬀset this loss of complexity.
Iteration count and brute-forcing Myphrase passwords. We experimented
with diﬀerent hash iteration counts, and found that 32768 caused an acceptable de-
lay for our PC (Firefox addon) and smartphone (Android app) implementations.
Running on a 2.5GHz Intel i7-2860 CPU, it required 2.84 ± 0.02 seconds to com-
plete for the addon. On a 1.2GHz ARM Cortex-A8 HTC smartphone it required
3.23 ± 0.06 seconds. With assembler and hardware crypto accelerated instructions
(e.g., OpenSSL) the time to iterate PBKDF2 reduced to 0.3 seconds on average.
Note that, the extension adds almost 10 times more ineﬃciency in the PBKDF2
calculation, which beneﬁts the attacker. Native code execution within the browser,
e.g., Google Native Client [110], can be used to reduce this ineﬃciency. An attacker
can also parallelize the computations to brute-force the dictionary. With a 60-bit
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passphrase, the attacker will need to perform 259 calculations on average. On a 4-




= 1370020420 years to search this space.
If the attacker has access to a grid of 1 million such 4-core CPUs (e.g., a million-
node botnet), it will still require 1370 years; without the hash iteration, the required
time is only about 15 days (on average). For a 40-bit passphrase, the required times
on the million-node grid are about 12 hours (with hash iteration) and 1.25 seconds
(without hash iteration) on average. An attacker may be able to reduce the time
using custom hardware (e.g., FPGAs, ASICs, or GPU arrays) or eﬃcient hashing
algorithms (cf. transferable state attack [100]). On the other hand, the attacker’s
workload to brute-force a target password will increase signiﬁcantly if the server-side
stores only a one-way mapping of the password obtained through the use of iterated
hash/PBKDF2 functions with unique salt values per account. If the adversary at-
tempts to brute-force the passphrase without the dictionary, he will need to attempt
lower-case strings. Since the passphrases are combinations of words, the adversary
can take advantage of the fact that these strings will not be random (e.g., using
Markov chains or a weighted preﬁx trie). In the worst case scenario, the passphrase
could be the (unlikely) combination of 6 one-character words. The workload will then
be at most log2(26
6) = 28.2. The search space for brute-forcing an individual site
password, under Myphrase’s default settings, is log2(62
12) = 71.45
4.5.3 UDS Evaluation of Myphrase
We now provide an analytical evaluation of Myphrase using the recently-proposed
UDS (usability, deployability, security) framework [10]. We modiﬁed the ratings
slightly, from the original three point scale, to include a fourth partial-benefit rat-
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ing. The partial-benefit rating exists between the original no-benefit and quasi-benefit
ratings, and indicates that a given beneﬁt is weakly, or only partially met. The quasi-
benefit rating still indicates that a given beneﬁt is almost fully met. For context,
we also include the ratings for regular user-chosen passwords, the Firefox password
manager, and the online password manager LastPass4 from the original UDS evalu-
ation. We also evaluate some similar schemes based on NLP, multi-word secrets, or
site-speciﬁc passwords generated from a master secret. Due to space limitation, we
refer readers to the UDS paper [10] for details of the framework and feature deﬁni-
tions. We have not conducted any formal user-testing yet; to help better design such
tests, we would like to get expert feedback and comments on our publicly available
prototype. Thus we would like to emphasize that our usability ratings for Myphrase
within the UDS framework are only best guesses, given the lack of empirical data on
regular users at this point. See Table 4.6 for the summary of our evaluation.
Myphrase UDS Ratings Explanation.
We use Quasi to refer to “almost full beneﬁt” and Partially to indicate “partial
beneﬁt only.” We rate Myphrase as Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless/U1: users must re-
member at least one secret; Scalable-for-Users/U2: site-speciﬁc passwords are gener-
ated from the master passphrase; Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry/U3: having the dictionary
aids usability (less typing and less error in typing), but passwords can be gener-
ated from memorized passphrases; we do not grant Physically-Effortless/U4 since,
if the dictionary is unavailable, the user is likely to type more characters (for most
passphrases) than a regular password; Myphrase is Partially-Efficient-to-Use/U6:






































































































































































































































































































































































































Text passwords    G#        G#     
Firefox G#  G# G#         G# G#      
LastPass G#  G# G#    G#  G#   G# G# G# G# G#     
Myphrase G#  G#  # G# #    #    G#       
Fastwords [47]   # G#    # G#     
Topkara [95] G#   # G# G#       G#      
Cheswick [16] G#  # G#    #         
Table 4.6: UDS evaluation of Myphrase. Key:  (offers the benefit); G# (almost offers the
benefit); # (offers partial benefit); blank (benefit not offered).
like a traditional password manager, the master passphrase must be entered for each
authentication; Quasi-Infrequent-Errors/U7: use of the same passphrase and auto-
ﬁll words from a drop-down menu may result in less typing errors; Partially-Easy-
Recovery-from-Loss/U8: losing the master secret requires re-setting all site pass-
words, although the user can browse their dictionary in an attempt to jog their mem-
ory; Partially-Browser-Compatible/D4: the web interface can be used when software
tools are unavailable; Non-Proprietary/D6: no known patents as we are aware of.
Myphrase is not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation/S1: all password input techniques
are vulnerable to physical observation, and inspecting the user’s auto-complete selec-
tions may allow an adversary to learn the master secret more easily; is Resilient-
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to-Targeted-Impersonation/S2: words in the passphrase are chosen randomly—so
having access to a user’s preference to certain words or even the user dictionary
will not help in targeted guessing; Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing/S3 and Quasi-
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing/S4: assuming at least 60 bits of entropy, the gen-
erated site-speciﬁc password is resilient against online guessing and to some extent,
against oﬄine attacks; Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers/S6 and Resilient-to-
Phishing/S7: each password is site-speciﬁc (i.e., salted by the site’s domain) and
retrieving the master passphrase from a compromised password requires non-trivial
computation power (on average, 259 password trials in the default setting; addition-
ally each trial needs 215 iterations of a hash function). This feature also restricts
malicious sites from replaying a user’s password to get access to another web account
of the user (perhaps to a more valuable account).
UDS comparison with Fastwords. We include Fastwords [47] as an example of
multi-word passwords where words are user-chosen. We rate it as not oﬀering U1 and
U2: users are required to remember several phrases (similar to regular passwords).
Fastwords are independent of any particular dictionary (except the widely-available
built-in English dictionary in current mobile platforms); we rate it to oﬀer U3. We rate
it as oﬀering Quasi -D3: it may require server-side changes as many websites currently
disallow the space character in passwords. Fastwords do not oﬀer D6: as mentioned at
fastword.me, the technology is patent-pending. Fastwords’ security features are rated
similar to text passwords; we believe it is unlikely to achieve signiﬁcant improvement
in this area, as long as user-choice is involved (cf. [11]).
UDS comparison with Topkara’s scheme. The Topkara [95] scheme uses NLP-
generated master passphrases for use as mnemonics. Their scheme also constructs
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site-speciﬁc passwords, using a pen-and-paper table-lookup. We rate it Quasi -U1:
since there is at least one secret to memorize; we grant U2: the cognitive load does
not become more diﬃcult for additional accounts; we do not grant U3 since the user
must carry the helper-cards, and additional accounts will require more cards; we
do not grant U4 since the user must perform a table-lookup and type in their site-
password; we rate Quasi -U6: the table-lookup and helper card construction require a
non-negligible amount of time; we do not grant U8 since losing the helper cards will
require resetting all site passwords; Quasi -D1: the scheme requires sight (although
Braille helper cards may mitigate this issue); we grant S2: card lookups are generated
from a random seed; Quasi -S4: the resulting site-passwords are at least 8 characters
long, including digits and special characters, which should exhibit log2(94
8) = 52 bits
of entropy at minimum; we grant S8: access to the card does not give an adversary
any signiﬁcant advantage.
UDS comparison with Cheswick’s scheme. Cheswick’s scheme [16] generates
a passphrase by randomly selecting words from a ﬁxed dictionary. We rate it as
not oﬀering U1 and U2 since, like Fastwords, users must memorize several phrases;
Quasi -U3: similar to Myphrase, the ﬁxed dictionary helps easy recall and typing;
Quasi -D3: server-side changes may be necessary to handle the space character.
4.5.4 Memorability of Myphrase Passphrases
We believe the memorability of a Myphrase passphrase is enhanced by the following
factors. (a) Frequent repetition: repeated use reduces the user’s working memory
load from potentially dozens of site passwords to one. (b) Semantic and syntactic
structures: words are apparently more memorable than random character strings,
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and sentences more memorable than random sequences of words. (c) Personally
meaningful words: familiarity with the passphrase components should make recall
easier. (d) Recognition of words: the auto-complete suggestions allow the user to
recognize their passphrase words from a list.
Our hypothesis is that Myphrase passphrases may retain security advantages of
random phrases without being too diﬃcult to remember. We would like to test this
hypothesis through a user study in the future. Below we discuss some related work
supporting the idea that personally meaningful words could be more memorable.
An fMRI study performed by Saykin et al. [82] shows that brain activity is much
greater, and takes place in more regions, when a subject is shown a familiar word
as compared to an unaccustomed word. Gregg [35] also suggests that recall of com-
mon words is higher than uncommon words. (Note that frequency ranked words in
Myphrase are by deﬁnition “common” to the user.) Hulme et al. [42] performed two
experiments: in the ﬁrst, non-word sequences were found to be less memorable than
words. The second experiment compared memorability of Italian and English words
on English-speaking participants. Users remembered English words better, but mem-
ory span for Italian words increased after learning the English translations. This also
supports the idea that a user will better remember words for which their semantics
are well known.
The auto-suggest feature of Myphrase reduces typing and may also jog the user’s
memory (i.e., the task of recall is partially reduced to recognition). However, it is
unclear to what extent this will help for overall memorization of the user’s passphrase,
including sequence. Early research by Gregg [35] suggests that recognition of words
is actually higher for uncommon words. In a recent recognition study [108], in the
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context of text based passwords, it was found that recognition of words was no better
than free-recall.
Our scheme can be thought of as a type of cued-recall in which the user must
recall the ﬁrst letter of the word, and then a cue is given (in this case a list of words,
or the word itself). It is usually agreed upon that cued-recall is much easier than
free-recall (e.g., [98]).
The connected discourse variant also leverages the semantic and syntactic struc-
ture of a sentence. Previous research (e.g., [63, 25, 60, 29, 61]) suggests that such
high-order patterns are more memorable than random sequences of words. A re-
cent study on the memorability of random passphrases performed by Shay et al. [87]
contradicts this notion, and indicates that there is little diﬀerence between recollec-
tion of random passwords versus passphrases. However, in this study (also in [108])
personally meaningful words were not used. Furthermore, users were not provided
any recognition cues, and did not beneﬁt from the repeated use of the phrase (one
Myphrase passphrase is expected to be used repeatedly for all or most web logins,
reducing the memory load and combating the the multiple password interference
problem [17]).
Words in a Myphrase passphrase should be more familiar to users; however, users
must memorize the sequence of these words—e.g., six words from a 1024-word dic-
tionary. Memorability of a phrase of such length appears to be feasible (albeit non-




Major limitations include: (a) Myphrase’s approach of using a master secret is sim-
ilar to several existing techniques—expecting that users will remember one strong
secret and derive all other site passwords from it. However, users most likely would
not change all their existing passwords to Myphrase at the outset (cf. [7]). Therefore,
the Myphrase passphrase would be “one more secret” to remember and will beneﬁt
users only in the long-run. However, users can gradually migrate their accounts under
a Myphrase password, and keep using regular text passwords along with Myphrase.
(b) A forgotten or compromised (e.g., via PC malware) Myphrase master passphrase
will incur selecting a new passphrase and resetting all site passwords—a major incon-
venience for users. Users may write down the passphrase and store it in a place not
accessible to others (cf. [111, 40]). Users may browse the dictionary to attempt to
recognize the forgotten words in the passphrase. (c) The dictionary may be lost or
unavailable to users (e.g., when using a new device). In such cases, typing errors may
increase as users must recall the exact words in the phrase without any cue. Posting
the dictionary to a public or semi-public website (e.g., Facebook) may enable access-
from-anywhere. The dictionary may also be re-created from the original sources used.
(d) The Myphrase tool is required to convert the master passphrase to a site password.
When the tool is unavailable (e.g., in a friend’s device), a website for this conversion is
available at: http://users.encs.concordia.ca/∼a skil/myphrase/myp-web/. The web
tool uses locally-executed JavaScript, and does not interface with any 3rd party web
services. The user may even download the script and execute it locally (oﬄine or
even in a virtual machine sandbox). The user enters their passphrase and the URL of
the site they wish to log into. The site password is then generated, and the user can
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copy–paste the site password into the login ﬁeld of the web service. (e)We anticipate
the use of Myphrase may increase the login time (e.g., we observed the time to be
close to 20 seconds for a 8-word phrase from our own experience on a PC–a formal
user study will result in a more accurate estimation). We expect that the repeated
use of the same passphrase may reduce the login time in the long-run.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Myphrase takes advantage of the already existing tendency towards choosing familiar
words as passwords. Users are generally frowned upon by security advocates for
making such choices, as these words can easily be subjected to dictionary attacks. In
contrast, Myphrase allows users to generate stronger passwords from a dictionary of
words they are familiar with or use in their daily communications. In the context of
FDE, regular user-chosen passwords do not provide adequate protection. For PDE-
enabled storage, a weak password can have dire consequences. Oﬄine guessing is
easily performed on an encrypted volume image or partial snapshot. Myphrase is
much more suitable for protecting encryption keys, given the relatively high entropy
attained by the master passphrase and context-speciﬁc passwords.
As discussed, Myphrase has several potential limitations, e.g., longer login times,
and memorizing a sequence of several words as the master passphrase. However, the
use of personal words may help user-acceptance5 — a major obstacle for any new
password scheme. The auto-suggest feature reduces typing, which may also make
Myphrase more suitable for mobile devices than regular passwords. However, we
5See e.g., the user study [8] of object-based password: users browse their personal images/music
files as part of the login mechanism; some users reportedly enjoyed interacting with such objects.
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would like to emphasize that no formal user-testing has been conducted yet. We
introduce Myphrase here to promote discussion on authentication schemes that can
sustain site-password leakage and are suitable for both desktop and mobile platforms.




Conclusions and Future Work
In certain situations, users require a level of protection beyond the semantic secu-
rity that is oﬀered by encryption. Deniable encryption techniques can be used to
augment standard encryption, to contend with a coercive adversary. This disserta-
tion examined the feasibility and eﬃcacy of deniable storage encryption for mobile
devices. The Mobiflage tool was designed and prototyped to assess the eﬀective secu-
rity and usability of the mobile deniable storage concept. The results are promising,
as Mobiﬂage addresses several leakage vectors while incurring a tolerable impact on
performance and usability. The implementation relies on a conscientious user that
will adhere to usage guidelines devised to prevent leakage or compromise through
inappropriate behaviour. One such directive is to choose a high entropy password to
protect the volume encryption keys. This dissertation also discussed a new password
scheme for that speciﬁc purpose.
The Myphrase design aims to facilitate passwords that are suitably strong for pro-
tection of encryption keys, easier to input on mobile devices, and alleviate the mem-
ory burden on the user. By building on research in cognitive psychology, Myphrase
passwords are constructed to oﬀer better memorability and security: familiar words
and structures are randomly combined to create user-speciﬁc multi-word passphrases.
The Myphrase scheme was designed to generate passwords with at least 60 bits of
entropy, plus 15 bits through PBKDF2. While this falls short of the current 80-bit
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infeasibility boundary, it still provides at least twice the average complexity of current
user-chosen passwords. Myphrase was implemented for PCs and mobile devices. The
Android implementation is suitable for use with the Mobiﬂage pre-boot authenticator,
demonstrating the utility for protection of encryption keys on mobile devices.
5.1 Future Research Goals
The research on deniable storage encryption and key-protection passwords has iden-
tiﬁed additional avenues that should be explored:
1. Flash storage wear-levelling – Without access to the raw ﬂash storage
cells (as with SD and eMMC), leakage through partial snapshots cannot be
prevented. It would be prudent to determine how easily LBAs can be correlated
to hidden volume data. This may inhibit the eﬀective security of PDE on mobile
devices.
2. Generalized deniable storage encryption – Newer Android devices
do not contain SD cards, precluding the current Mobiﬂage implementation.
Likewise, other platforms (e.g., iOS) use the MTP protocol and share inter-
nal/external storage. The Mobiﬂage design can be adapted, and implemented
for use with MTP devices to provide a general solution for mobile devices.
3. Usability study of Myphrase – The memorability of Myphrase remains
conjecture at this point. There is strong support from existing research in cog-
nitive psychology, however, until a formal user study is conducted, the memo-
rability aspects cannot be conﬁrmed.
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Appendix A
Crypto Primitives and Deniability
Certain crypto primitives, such as ciphers and pseudorandom number generators
(PRNGs), may leak information that can compromise deniability. For example, at-
tacks have been discovered against the CBC mode of operation, when applied to disk
encryption (e.g., [32]). This chapter gives details about possible attacks against CBC,
when used for data-at-rest, that may compromise deniability. These attacks justify
the use of XTS-AES in Mobiﬂage (the default Android encryption implementation
uses the CBC mode).
Plaintext difference attack. A plaintext diﬀerence attack has been demonstrated
(e.g., by Fruhwirth [32]). If any two ciphertext blocks within a volume sector, Cm =
Ek(Pm ⊕ Cm−1) and Cn = Ek(Pn ⊕ Cn−1), are identical, the adversary can learn the
diﬀerence between the original plaintexts. The preceding blocks, Cm−1 and Cn−1, are
also known to the adversary since they exist in the sector immediately preceding the
blocks in question. Since Cm = Cn, it holds that:
Pm ⊕ Cm−1 = Pn ⊕ Cn−1
Which may be expressed as:
Cm−1 ⊕ Cn−1 = Pn ⊕ Pm
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The adversary can now deduce the diﬀerence in plaintexts. In the case where either
Pn or Pm is zero, the adversary can recover the original plaintext of the other block.
In Mobiﬂage, the storage is ﬁlled with random bytes, however some regions may have
been zeroed (e.g., the inode table and block bitmaps in an Ext4 block group are zeroed
during formatting). This may allow the adversary to reveal fragments of hidden data
if the CBC mode is used.
This is mostly a theoretical attack, as the probability of two identical blocks in
a sector is very low: treating the cipher output as a random distribution (a relaxed
assumption), for the AES block size of 128 bits, and a disk sector size of 512 Bytes,
then








Furthermore, assuming an equally likely distribution of ciphertext blocks, the proba-
bility that any given block in a sector will be all zeros is:
P (one block in a sector is all zeros) = 32/(2128) = 9.4039548× 10−38
For a per-sector probability of 1.98× 10−1269 that the attack conditions will be met.
There are 2097152 sectors per GB, so even for a 64GB disk there is only a negligible




Watermarking attack. Under certain schemes, the sector IVs are predictable (e.g.,
the index of the disk sector). This gives rise to a chosen plaintext attack known as
watermarking, as demonstrated by the authors of [32, 81]. Watermarking manifests
itself as a data existence leak, and can defeat deniable storage encryption. The attack
is mounted by encrypting a special plaintext ﬁle to produce two sectors where the
ﬁrst ciphertext block of each sector is identical:
IV1 ⊕ P1 = IV2 ⊕ P2
Equivalently:
IV1 ⊕ IV2 = P1 ⊕ P2
This pattern, or watermark, can be detected in the encrypted data even when the
key and cipher are unknown. An adversary may trick a user into storing such a ﬁle
in their hidden volume, then seize the device and search for the watermark, proving
the existence of the hidden volume.
Copy-and-paste attack. An adversary can move pairs of ciphertext blocks from
one area of the disk to another. Since the decryption of a plaintext block Pi depends
only on the ciphertext blocks Ci and Ci−1, the block will decrypt properly no matter
where it exists on the disk. This has serious implications for deniability: a pair of
ciphertext blocks can be moved outside of the deniable region of a volume. The block
will decrypt to unintelligible plaintext since a diﬀerent key is being used. Unless empty
regions of the disk were ﬁlled with random data before encryption, the adversary
would expect zero sectors or old ﬁle fragments, proving the existence of hidden data
and additional keys. Most PDE storage schemes, including Mobiﬂage, ﬁll vacant
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storage with random bytes which should prevent the discovery of a hidden volume. In
addition, Mobiﬂage uses the XEX tweaked-codebook with ciphertext stealing (XTS)
mode which is not susceptible to the copy-and-paste attack, since the tweak operation
depends on a block’s sector index and will produce a diﬀerent result when moved.
Tweakable block ciphers. Special tweakable cipher modes, such as LRW and
XTS, were created speciﬁcally for disk encryption, to prevent or mitigate known
attacks. IEEE Std 1619-2007 [43] deﬁnes the XTS-AES mode of operation. It has
been approved by NIST [68] as the preferred disk encryption block cipher. XTS
mode is a code book mode (i.e., no block chaining) which uses a secondary tweak key
to make unpredictable use of the disk sector index. The IEEE standard rates the
security of the system as equivalent to using ECB mode with a diﬀerent key for each
block. It is important to note that the security of XTS rests on the security of AES.
The XTS-AES cipher mode works as follows:




⊕ is the exclusive OR operation,
⊗ is multiplication over the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(2128) modulo x128 + x7 + x2 + x+ 1,
K1 is the AES encryption key,
K2 is the tweak key,
i is the cipher block index within a 512-byte sector,
n is the sector index on the disk, and
a is a primitive element of Galois Field (2128) that corresponds to the polynomial x.
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The IEEE standard does warn against encryption of more than a few hundred
terabytes with the same key. This may introduce the possibility of certain chosen
ciphertext attacks discussed in the standard. The attacks are not unique to XTS.
They are the result of the 128-bit AES block size and the birthday paradox (i.e.,
use of a larger key space will not mitigate these attacks). This is not a problem for





In this chapter we discuss a dictionary attack against the default Android encryption
scheme. As a result of the implementation choices in the Android security model,
this brute-force attack, if successful, will also recover the device-unlock secret.
The Android FDE subsystem reuses the screen-unlock secret, to protect the en-
cryption key, with 2000 iterations of PBKDF2. It is the user’s responsibility to choose
a suitably strong password, to prevent a dictionary attack. The pre-boot authentica-
tion prompt will time-out for 30 seconds after 10 failed password attempts. In order
to mount an online attack, attempting all 4 and 5 digit PIN codes (110,000 total),
the device will be unresponsive for almost 3 days and 20 hours. The actual attack
will take longer, as there is a non-negligible delay to test each PIN with PBKDF2.
Since the adversary can, on average, obtain the correct PIN after exhausting 50%
of the search space, this online attack is feasible. If the user chooses a longer PIN
however, and the adversary has to attempt all possible PINs between 4 and 9 digits
(1,111,110,000 total), the device would be timed-out for almost 106 years.
An oﬄine attack against the encryption system is also possible, if the adversary
can obtain an image of the device’s encrypted storage. Physical storage acquisition
techniques, such as JTAG and “chip-oﬀ”, can be used to obtain such an image (see
e.g., Hoog [41, pp. 266–284]). Logical acquisition techniques, such as installing a
custom recovery image with root privileges, may also be possible.
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The PBKDF2-protected volume key is contained in the encrypted volume’s footer.
A brute-force attack can be mounted to attempt to decrypt the volume key. When
the correct screen-unlock secret is found, the resulting volume key will decrypt a valid
ﬁlesystem. A tool, droidcrack, was created to test the feasibility of such a dictionary
attack against an encrypted Android disk image (source code available at http://users.
encs.concordia.ca/∼a skil/droidcrack/). The experiments were conducted on a single
core of a 3.4GHz Intel Core i7-2600, running Ubuntu 12.04 with the OpenSSL 1.0.0
library. To perform the oﬄine attack against all 4 and 5 digit PINs required 9 minutes
and 2 seconds. To test all PINs between 4 and 9 digits required 63 days 7 hours and
35 minutes. On average the correct PIN would be identiﬁed after one month, making
this attack feasible, even on commodity hardware. These experiments demonstrate
that weak passwords cannot be relied upon to protect encryption keys. The eight-
character lower-case search space (268) would require 32.6 years on this hardware, but
may be feasible with parallelization. For comparison, the search space for passwords
generated by Myphrase is, by default, 6212 and would require 1.0 × 1014 years to
exhaust on this hardware. If the Myphrase dictionary is available to the adversary,
then the search space is reduced to 260 and would require 1.8 × 108 years. Both of
these scenarios can be considered infeasible. Increasing the PBKDF2 iteration count,
as discussed in Section 3.7, can slow a brute-force attack, but is insuﬃcient alone. A
strong password is necessary to ensure an exhaustive search is infeasible.
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